Malingering Undetected Successfully: Does Extrinsic Motivation and Coaching Have a Significant Impact? by Golanics, Jennifer
UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones 
August 2018 
Malingering Undetected Successfully: Does Extrinsic Motivation 
and Coaching Have a Significant Impact? 
Jennifer Golanics 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations 
 Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, and the Educational Psychology Commons 
Repository Citation 
Golanics, Jennifer, "Malingering Undetected Successfully: Does Extrinsic Motivation and Coaching Have a 
Significant Impact?" (2018). UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 3361. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.34917/14139876 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital 
Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that 
is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to 
obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons 
license in the record and/or on the work itself. 
 
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and 
Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact 
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu. 
 
MALINGERING UNDETECTED SUCCESSFULLY: DOES EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
AND COACHING HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT? 
 
 
 
By 
 
Jennifer Dawn Golanics 
 
Bachelor of Science – Elementary Education 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
2004 
 
Master of Science – Educational Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
2005 
 
Juris Doctor 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
2011 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the  
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy – Educational Psychology 
 
 
 
 
Department of Educational Psychology and Higher Education 
College of Education 
The Graduate College 
 
 
 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
August 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2018 by Jennifer Golanics 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
  
 
Dissertation Approval 
The Graduate College 
The University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
        
June 22, 2018
This dissertation prepared by  
Jennifer Dawn Golanics 
entitled  
Malingering Undetected Successfully: Does Extrinsic Motivation And Coaching Have A 
Significant Impact?  
is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy – Educational Psychology 
Department of Educational Psychology and Higher Education 
 
                
E. Michael Nussbaum, Ph.D.       Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D. 
Examination Committee Chair     Graduate College Interim Dean 
 
Dana Bickmore, Ph.D. 
Examination Committee Member 
        
Scott Loe, Ph.D. 
Examination Committee Member 
 
Joseph Morgan, Ph.D.  
Graduate College Faculty Representative 
 
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The present study examined the effectiveness of a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) 
coaching (i.e., providing information about mTBI symptoms) and motivational incentive (i.e., a 
$50 gift card lottery) on the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM) test 
performance. The sample included a total of 162 undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in 
an introductory educational psychology course. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
six conditions: coached plus warning instruction and motivation incentive, coached instruction 
and motivation incentive, uncoached instruction and motivation incentive, coached plus warning 
instruction and no motivation incentive, coached instruction and no motivation incentive, and 
uncoached instruction and no motivation incentive (control) (n=27, per condition).   
 Upon arrival for the study, all of the participants completed the ANAM and were told to 
do their best (pre-ANAM). Participants in the coached conditions were provided with a one-page 
document including several mTBI symptoms. In addition to the one-page document, participants 
in the coached plus warning conditions were informed that to be identified as faking the disorder, 
to not exaggerate the symptoms too much.  Whereas, participants in the motivation conditions 
were informed they were eligible for an incentive for participation (i.e., a $50 gift card lottery) if 
they can feign mTBI and avoid being identified as faking the disorder. The participants in the 
coached and motivation conditions completed the ANAM a second time and were asked to feign 
mTBI.  Participants in the control condition were not provided additional information and were 
asked to do their best on their second ANAM attempt.   
The results suggest that providing both a coaching instruction and a motivational 
incentive (i.e. treatment groups) decreased the participants’ performance on their overall ANAM 
total accuracy scores, in comparison to the participants not receiving the treatment (i.e. control). 
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Further, coaching instructions and motivational incentives aided in feigning mTBI symptoms on 
the ANAM by participants performing poorly on the ANAM total accuracy measure. However, 
even though participants feigned mTBI symptoms when provided a coaching instruction and a 
motivation incentive, the ANAM Effort Measure detected the participants feigning mTBI, which 
rendered their scores invalid for a clinical diagnosis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
An assumption of psychological assessment is that the assessments are measuring subject 
characteristics.  However, there is a significant percentage of psychological test subjects who 
present themselves in a manipulated, rather than forthcoming manner (Rogers, 2008). 
Psychological assessments should measure the actual test subject’s characteristics.  The 
manipulated presentation is often what is known as malingering (Anderson, 2008; Erdal, 2009; 
Resnick, 1994; Rogers, 2008; Rogers & Payne, 2006).  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V) defines malingering as “intentional production of false 
or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 726).  These external incentives are sometimes 
referred to as secondary gain (Rogers & Payne, 2006).  Malingering differs from factitious 
disorders such as psychosomatic illnesses or conversion disorders in that, with such factitious 
disorders, external incentives are absent.  
Effectively evaluating malingering, the related responses, and their empirical bases, are 
critical to forensic evaluations (Rogers & Mitchell, 1991).  The potential for malingering on 
nearly all psycholegal issues must be addressed by psychologists and other mental health 
professionals, considering the adversarial nature of forensic assessments (Rogers & Mitchell, 
1991).  Although the prevalence of malingering tends to differ depending on the forensic setting, 
malingering likely makes up one sixth of all forensic cases (Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, 
& Leonard, 1998; Rogers, Sewell, & Goldstein, 1994).  More recently, the base rate of probable 
and definite malingering in a criminal forensic setting has been estimated at 54.3 percent (Ardolf, 
Denney, & Houston, 2007).  In a civil setting, specifically for mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) 
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cases, the base rate of probable malingering is estimated at 30 to 40 percent where an external 
incentive, such as, compensation, is to be gained (Larrabee, 2003; Larrabee, Millis, & Meyers, 
2009).  
Classifying malingering properly is invaluable in forensic evaluations.  Genuine efforts to 
determine precise estimates of malingering are necessary to avoid tragic mistakes.  Rogers and 
Cruise (1998) found that the effect of a party to litigation being falsely accused of malingering is 
devastating.  At the same time, undetected malingering can be devastating for the survivors of a 
crime and increase insurance premiums (Rogers & Cruise, 1998).  Fortunately, many 
psychological assessments have been created with validity scales embedded within them (Rogers 
& Payne, 2006).  A validity scale helps those interpreting the assessment to determine whether 
the test subject is likely giving honest and consistent answers (Rogers & Payne, 2006).  Some 
validity scales focus on a participant’s effort while completing an assessment.  Thus, a 
participant’s effort is considered a part of malingering (Iverson, 2007).  Definite malingering 
occurs when poor effort (i.e. below chance performance) that is clear and convincing is shown 
while testing (Iverson, 2007, p. 131).   
However, another important aspect for practitioners in detecting malingering is to 
understand how the theoretical constructs within motivational theory, such as, expectancy x 
value, relate to why and how people malinger (Anderson, 2008; Constantinou & McCaffrey, 
2003; Erdal, 2009; Nagle et al., 2006).  Expectancy x value theory combines one’s expectancy to 
succeed and the value placed on successfully achieving a given task (Atkinson, 1957; Eccles & 
Wigfield, 2002; Eccles, Wigfield, & Schiefele, 1998; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992, 2000).  In 
relation to malingering, expectancy x value theory would predict that the motivation to malinger 
is a function not only of motivational incentives but also requires expectations that one can 
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malinger well and will not be caught doing so.  A person may believe he or she can malinger 
well if he or she is coached or has knowledge on the specific disorder expected to be feigned.  
Specifically, if a participant is coached on mTBI, he or she will be more confident about feigning 
mTBI because he or she will have knowledge of the symptoms.  One would therefore predict, if 
the participant is confident about completing the task (i.e. malingering well and without being 
caught) due to the effects of coaching and is provided a motivation incentive to malinger 
undetected, then he or she will put forth more effort to malinger undetected. 
Various studies have found that people can be taught to malinger.  In a meta-analytic 
review, studies showed there was a significant difference in the effects of coaching between 
identifying feigning of severe mental disorders as opposed to mood and anxiety disorders 
(Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009).  In other studies, coached students achieved higher clinical 
elevations in simulating depression and PTSD (Hickling et al., 1999; Rogers et al., 1993).  Erdal 
(2004) found motivation and coaching altered the performance of simulated malingering of a 
head injury (mild traumatic brain injury; mTBI) participants.  Erdal (2004) used a 2 student 
group (introductory psychology, advanced neuroscience) x 3 motivations (none given, 
compensation, avoid blame) x 3 coaching levels (none given, coaching mTBI symptoms, 
coaching plus warning of malingering detection) factorial design.  Participants were administered 
two assessments (Rey’s 15-Item Test (FIT), Dot Counting Test (DCT)).  Based on previous 
research, Erdal (2004) predicted the participants with less prior knowledge (introductory 
psychology undergraduates) receiving coaching of mTBI symptoms plus warning of malingering 
detection would not be detected as malingers while feigning mTBI on both assessments.  Erdal 
(2004) found the participants with more prior knowledge (advanced neuroscience 
undergraduates) were detected as malingerers more often than the participants with less prior 
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knowledge (introductory psychology undergraduates) but only on the FIT.  The advanced 
neuropsychology students added significantly more new items during recall while in the 
compensation group than did the introductory psychology students.  There was no interaction 
between motivation and student group on the Dot Counting Test (DCT).  Therefore, the 
advanced neuropsychology students malingered more conspicuously than the introductory 
psychology students suggesting that knowledge of neuropsychology may be a detriment to 
malingering.  However, knowledge of neuropsychology was not a robust variable in her study 
possibly because of the limitations of a small sample size and confounding the variables of 
previous knowledge and knowledge from coaching.   
Additionally, Erdal (2004) found participants receiving a simulated motivational 
incentive (i.e. compensation) to malinger and receiving coaching on the symptoms of the 
condition plus warned about malingering detection methods, were detected as malingerers more 
often than the participants in the other experimental conditions but only on the DCT.  There was 
no interaction between motivation and coaching on FIT.  There was a main effect for motivation 
and coaching on the DCT qualitative scores (ungrouped total time v. grouped total time).  The 
participants in the compensation condition took significantly longer to complete the assessment 
than the control condition. In addition, the participants in both the coached and coached with 
warning about malingering detection conditions took significantly longer to complete the 
assessment than the control condition.  It is possible there were no main effect for the accuracy 
measure on the DCT because of the limitations of this study.    
To investigate motivation manipulation further, Erdal (2009) assigned participants to one 
of the four motivational conditions (no motivation, avoiding blame, compensation, and attention-
seeking) and administered three neuropsychological assessments (DCT, California Verbal 
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Learning Test, Benton Visual Retention Test).  Erdal (2009) found participants receiving a 
simulated motivational incentive (i.e. compensation or attention from friends and family) to 
malinger were detected as malingerers on all three assessments.  That is, those motivated by 
compensation performed similarly to those who desired attention (Erdal, 2009).  Thus, except for 
the avoid blame condition, motivation to malinger for compensation or attention-seeking, 
significantly impacted test performance negatively (Erdal, 2009). 
Both studies found the participants assigned to the motivational condition of 
compensation were detected as malingerers (Erdal, 2004; Erdal, 2009).  Additionally, Erdal 
(2004) found participants assigned to the motivational condition of compensation and receiving 
coaching were detected as malingerers but only on one specific assessment.  These findings are 
important because the assessment used may be a critical factor in detecting malingering.  Also, in 
a real-world scenario, compensation will likely be a secondary gain sought after. However, as 
previously stated, being falsely accused of malingering, as well as, not detecting malingering can 
be devastating (Rogers & Cruise, 1998). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to apply expectancy x value theory to explain and replicate 
the finding that receiving a motivational incentive and coaching (i.e., providing information 
about mTBI symptoms) will significantly impact test performance.  This study used a 2 x 3 x 2 
repeated measures factorial design, with a coached condition (coached plus warning, coached, 
not coached) as one factor, a motivational (incentive) goal (versus no goal) as the second factor, 
and time as the third factor.  The participants, consisted of undergraduates and graduates enrolled 
in different sections of an educational psychology course, were administered two assessments, 
the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM) and the Mild Traumatic Brain 
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Injury Symptoms Checklist (mTBI Symptoms Checklist).  The participants were instructed to 
put forth their best effort during the first administration of the assessments.  Then, the 
participants were randomly assigned into six groups (coached plus warning instruction and 
motivation incentive, coached instruction and motivation incentive, uncoached instruction and 
motivation incentive, coached plus warning instruction and no motivation incentive, coached 
instruction and no motivation incentive, and uncoached instruction and no motivation incentive 
i.e. optimal performance group).  Each group was instructed to put forth their best effort or put 
forth their best effort to feign mTBI.  Once the instructions were read, the assessments were re-
administered, respectively. 
This study contributed to the research literature by providing additional information on 
the effects of providing a motivational incentive and coaching have on simulating mTBI 
symptoms.  Additionally, the study examined the interaction between providing a motivational 
incentive and coaching in regards to simulating mTBI symptoms. Specifically, the study applied 
expectancy x value theory to explain the impact such variables have on test performance.  
However, different from previous research, the motivational incentive provided was a tangible 
incentive (compensation e.g. $50 gift card lottery) rather than the more common simulated one.  
The limitations of Erdal (2004, 2009) studies included using simulated rather than real-world 
incentives.  It was possible participants would put forth greater effort to malinger undetected if 
they received a tangible incentive.           
Also, this study included a larger sample size (27 participants per group) than previous 
studies, assessed baseline scores of all participants, and assessed knowledge as a covariate to 
control for the variable of previous knowledge of mTBI symptoms. For example, Erdal (2004) 
had a small sample size of 34 participants having knowledge of neuropsychology randomly 
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assigned to 10 groups (i.e. three to four participants per group) and was not able to determine 
which knowledge (i.e. previous knowledge, as opposed to knowledge gained from the coaching 
instructions) had an effect on the results.  In regards to baseline scores, Erdal (2004, 2009) did 
not include baseline scores assessed before the participants were presented with the intervention.  
It was possible that participants would have scored the same on the assessment regardless of the 
condition randomly assigned, meaning, the effect did not come from the treatment.  The purpose 
of baseline scores or pre-test scores was to test for the presence of selection effects, i.e., whether 
there are significant initial differences between the groups.  The baseline scores of all 
participants were assessed by having the participants complete two administrations of the 
assessments in the study. As a result, time (pre- and post- treatment) was considered as a factor 
in this study.   
Additionally, there is no research currently on the interaction between motivation and 
coaching and their effects in simulating mTBI on the ANAM.  Therefore, the results of this study 
aided in determining whether there is a statistically significant interaction between coaching and 
motivation in general and while using the ANAM.   
Research Questions 
The research questions addressed in this study are: 
1) Is there a significant difference in performance between treatment and control 
groups on the pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
2) Is there a significant difference in performance between treatment and control 
groups on the post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
3) Do participants in the treatment groups (i.e. instructed to feign mTBI 
symptoms) differ in their ANAM Effort Measure in comparison to control? 
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4) Are there positive interactions between the motivation and coached 
conditions? 
Based on the literature, the following hypotheses were made:  
1) There will be a significant difference in performance between treatment and 
control groups on the pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy scores. 
Specifically, the coaching plus motivational incentive and coaching conditions 
will decrease the ANAM total accuracy scores (feigning clinical mTBI) 
between the pre- and post-. The degree to which the ANAM total accuracy 
scores will be differentially influenced by coaching and motivation is 
exploratory.   
2) There will be a significant difference in performance between treatment and 
control groups on the post- ANAM total accuracy scores. Specifically, the 
coaching plus motivational incentive and coaching conditions will have lower 
ANAM total accuracy scores (feigning clinical mTBI) than the other groups. 
The degree to which the ANAM total accuracy scores will be differentially 
influenced by coaching and motivation is exploratory.   
3) The participants who are trained to malinger mTBI will differ in their ANAM 
Effort Measure in comparison to control. 
4) There will be a positive interaction between the motivation and coached 
conditions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITURATURE 
This section will discuss the following relevant literature: 1. Models of Malingering, 2. 
Assessing Malingering, 3. Motivation, Motivational Theory for Malingering, 4. Coaching 
Malingering, 5. Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 6. Effort and Malingering, and 7. Study Focus and 
Research Questions.     
Models of Malingering 
There are many different models of malingering.  Resnick (1995) defined pure 
malingering as feigning a disease when that disease is not present whatsoever in the individual.  
Partial malingering is the mere exaggeration of real symptoms or the contention that one suffers 
from symptoms that have been resolved (Resnick, 1995).  False imputation is the fraudulent and 
conscious attribution of real symptoms to a known false cause (Resnick, 1995).  In many 
malingering studies utilizing simulation designs (i.e., where participants feign malingering), the 
participants feign pure malingering (McGuire, 1999). 
Rogers et al. (1998) and Rogers et al. (1994) presented empirical evidence that 
explanatory models (pathogenic, criminological, and adaptational) seek to uncover the 
underlying motivation.  The pathogenic model, stating the conscious fabrication of symptoms 
eventually creates a genuine disorder, pertains to malingerers motivated by psychopathology 
(Rogers et al., 1998; Rogers et al., 1994).  The criminological model of malingering asserts an 
“antisocial and oppositional" motivation (Rogers et al., 1998; Rogers et al., 1994).  According to 
the criminological model, certain individuals, unconcerned with social or legal consequences, 
fabricate symptoms for perceived rewards that they have not earned and do not deserve (Rogers 
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et al., 1998; Rogers et al., 1994).  The adaptational model assumes that malingering is a strategic 
attempt to succeed in an adversarial system (Rogers et al., 1998; Rogers et al., 1994).  According 
to the adaptational model, the malingerer engages in a cost-benefit analysis with respect to 
malingering and chooses to malinger as an alternative to other options (Rogers et al., 1998; 
Rogers et al., 1994).  
Significantly, Rogers et al. (1998) found that explanatory models have utility in both 
forensic and nonforensic contexts.  Significant differences were found in malingering cases 
based on the category of referral (i.e., forensic or nonforensic) and according to the type of 
feigning (i.e., mental disorders, cognitive impairment, and medical syndromes) (Rogers et al., 
1998).  According to Rogers et al. (1998), the feigning of medical conditions seemed to play a 
significant role in forensic and nonforensic cases and was influenced by the “adversarial context 
of the assessment.” 
In addition, understanding explanatory models is important for two reasons (Rogers et al., 
1994).  First, knowledge about malingerers’ motivation may help psychologists develop more 
effective measures for discovering malingering by accounting for “trait and situational variables” 
(Rogers et al., 1994, p. 544).  Second, researchers explain a psychologists' views regarding 
malingers’ motivations may unduly influence their assessment and consequent recommendations 
(Rogers et al., 1994).  For example, the DSM-III-R's endorses a criminological model, which 
emphasizes, antisocial backgrounds and forensic settings (Rogers et al., 1994).   
Assessing Malingering 
The DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) provides that malingering should 
be “strongly suspected” if “any combination” of the following factors are present:  
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1. A medicolegal context of presentation (e.g., a person is referred by an attorney to the 
clinician, or a person self-refers because of pending litigation or criminal charges); 
2. A marked discrepancy between the person’s claimed stress from the disability and the 
objective findings; 
3. A lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying with the 
prescribed treatment regimen; 
4. The presence of antisocial Personality Disorder  
(p. 726). 
These criteria, however, are not particularly useful in identifying malingerers (Anderson, 
2008).  Additionally, Anderson (2008) argues there are not any established diagnostic criteria for 
malingering.  However, there are several traditional assessments used for detecting malingering, 
such as, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Disorder-2 (MMPI-2) (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, 
Tellegen & Kaemmer; 1989), the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) (Morey, 1991), the 
Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) (Rogers, Bagby & Dickens, 1992) and the 
Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) (Widows & Smith, 2005). 
The MMPI-2 is one of the most frequently used personality tests in mental health, used to 
assist in identifying personality structure and psychopathology (Berry, Baer, & Harris, 1991; 
Butcher et al., 1989; Witt & Weitz, 2007).  It is used in the context of detecting malingering in 
the context of psychological problems (Berry, Baer, & Harris, 1991).  This test was not 
specifically designed to assess malingering (Witt & Weitz, 2007).  However, the MMPI-2 has a 
relevant scale for the detection of malingering (Witt & Weitz, 2007).  The MMPI is a series of 
567 items designed to detect various psychological phenomena with an administration time 
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between 60-90 minutes (Butcher et al., 1989).  The MMPI has an “F scale,” or infrequency scale, 
which addresses symptoms that are associated with serious psychopathology but are rarely found 
in patients with serious disorders (Butcher et al., 1989).  That is, most genuine psychiatric 
patients would report a subset of the items, but not all of them (Berry, Baer, & Harris, 1991).  An 
endorsement of all items would indicate either “extreme psychosis,” a “cry for help,” random 
responding, or malingering (Berry et al., 1991, p. 586).  Based on a meta-analysis of 28 studies, 
Berry et al. (1991) found that the MMPI scales accurately separate known or “suspected” 
malingerers from those completing the inventory honestly.   
Baer, Wetter and Berry (1992) explore underreporting of psychopathology on the MMPI, 
employing meta-analytic techniques with respect to 25 studies.  In these studies, researchers 
compared subjects giving honest responses to subjects underreporting psychopathology (Baer et 
al., 1992).  The results suggested that those who underreport psychopathology differ from those 
who respond honestly (Baer et al., 1992). 
The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) is a 344-item inventory that identifies 
overreporting of psychopathology with an administration time of about 50 minutes to complete 
(Morey, 1991).  According to Rogers, Ornduff, and Sewell (1993), the PAI is a significant 
development in psychopathological assessment.  Hawes and Boccaccini (2009) describe the PAI 
as a self-administered objective personality measure used to assess critical client variables.  
Hawes and Boccaccini (2009), report that support for the PAI in forensic and correctional 
contexts has increased rapidly.   
The PAI includes the following three validity measures to identify overreporting of 
psychological problems: Negative Impression Scale (NIM), Malingering Index (MAL), and 
Rogers Discriminate Function (RDF) (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009; Morey, 1996).     
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The NIM consists of PAI items that are not frequently endorsed in the community and 
clinical normative samples (Morey, 1996).  The NIM is not, per se, a malingering scale, which 
may limit the use of NIM score as an indicator of psychopathology malingering (Morey, 2007, p. 
29).  Rogers et al. (1993) explored the efficacy of the NIM scale in detecting naïve (i.e., 
undergraduates with minimal preparation) and sophisticated (psychology graduate students with 
one week of preparation) subjects who were instructed to simulate specific psychological 
disorders.  The researchers found that the NIM cutting score was effective, specifically for 
detecting the participants that were feigning schizophrenia and somewhat effective for detecting 
the participants that were feigning depression (Rogers et al., 1993).  However, the NIM cutting 
score was not effective for detecting the participants that were feigning generalized anxiety 
disorder (Rogers et al., 1993).  The more sophisticated students did not appear to be more 
effective feigners (Rogers et al., 1993).  However, the more sophisticated students simulated 
depression at higher clinical elevations (Rogers et al., 1993).  More importantly, this study 
obtained similar results of another study that indicated the PAI level of accuracy to detect 
feigning of an affectively based disorder, such as generalized anxiety disorder is low (Rogers et 
al., 1993).       
Another study concerning the PAI investigated the association between the NIM scale 
and clinical scales in the normative standardization sample (Hopwood, Morey, Rogers & Sewell, 
2007).  Researchers tested Morey’s (1999) method which contrasts predicted NIM scale scores 
against observed scores in order to interpret deliberately feigned disorders (Hopwood, et al., 
2007).  Hopwood, et al. (2007) found that this method was effective in identifying distortion for 
individuals who attempt to feign major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and 
schizophrenia. 
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 The second and third PAI measures used to detect over reporting of psychopathology, 
report Hawes and Boccaccini (2009), were developed specifically to identify malingering.  The 
Malingering Index (MAL) is based on eight characteristics which are often correlated with 
feigned psychological problems (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009; Morey, 1996).  For instance, those 
with genuine depression problems tend to report that they want to be treated (Hawes & 
Boccaccini, 2009; Morey, 1996).  Accordingly, on the MAL Index, those who report depression 
but do not want treatment are suspected malingerers (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009; Morey, 1996).  
The Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) was developed during a study by Rogers, Sewell, 
Morey and Ustad (1996) and proved to be an accurate screening measure.  The RDF is based on 
a “weighted combination of 20 PAI scale scores and a constant value” (Hawes & Boccaccini, 
2009, p. 112).  Hawes and Boccaccini (2009) found that the PAI validity is comparable to the 
MMPI-2.   
Similar to the MMPI-2 and PAI objective personality assessments, but developed 
specifically to detect malingering, is the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) 
(Rogers et al., 1992: Witt & Weitz; 2007).  The SIRS, currently SIRS-2, is a 172-item structured 
interview designed to detect malingering and other forms of feigning of psychiatric symptoms 
with an administration time between 45 and 60 minutes (Rogers et al., 1992; Rogers, Gillis, 
Dickens, and Bagby, 1991; Rogers, Sewell & Gillard, 2010).  The SIRS was devised to evaluate 
strategies used to assess malingering (Rogers et al., 1991).    
One of the first studies to test the validity of the SIRS used male inmates split into two 
groups (25 were asked to fake a mental illness and 26 were controls) (Rogers, Gillis, and Bagby, 
1990).  According to Rogers et al. (1990), six of the 13 SIRS scales differentiated between 
subjects that were simulating feigning and one that were not.   
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Rogers et al. (1991) conducted two studies to evaluate the SIRS discriminant and 
concurrent validity.  In the first study, there were four groups (two groups were given the 
instruction to feign a serious mental illness and two groups were controls), and the researchers 
found that there was a high level of discriminability between simulators and controls (Rogers et 
al., 1991).  In the second study 25 suspected malingerers were compared to 26 psychiatric 
inpatients and nine of the 13 SIRS scales discriminated between the two groups (Rogers et al., 
1991).   However, this indicates that not all the SIRS scales can effectively evaluate malingerers 
(Rogers et al., 1991).    
 Other researchers have sought to test the effectiveness of the SIRS in detecting specific 
malingering (i.e., as to schizophrenia, mood disorders, and PTSD) (Rogers, Kropp, Bagby, and 
Dickens, 1992).  The researchers found that in the clinical samples the SIRS was effective in 
detecting malingering and suggested further research regarding the fabrication of specific mental 
disorders using other tests (Rogers et al., 1992). 
The Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) is a 75-item self-report 
screening tool that assesses for malingered symptoms (Rogers & Cruise, 1998; Smith, 1997; 
Smith & Burger, 1997; Widows & Smith, 2005).  The SIMS contains five scale domains 
including psychosis, neurological impairment, amnestic disorders, low intelligence, and affective 
disorders (Smith, 1997; Smith & Burger, 1997; Rogers & Cruise, 1998; Widows & Smith, 2005). 
The SIMS contains cutoff scores that indicate the likelihood that malingering is occurring 
(Rogers and Cruise, 1998).  Researchers found that the SIMS was an accurate screening tool for 
assessing malingering (Edens, Otto, & Dwyer, 1999; Rogers, Hinds, & Sewell, 1996; Smith & 
Burger, 1997).  However, researchers found that the SIMS produces higher false positive rates, 
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meaning the results will indicate that a person is malingering when in fact his or her symptoms 
are genuine, when used in a clinical setting (Edens et al., 1999).   
Although, the MMPI, SIRS, SIMS, and PAI (traditional non-computer-based 
assessments) are all used for detecting malingering, those assessments are time consuming to 
take, with a range of 75 to 567 items and a minimum of 45 to 60 minutes to administer (Butcher 
et al., 1989; Morey, 1991; Rogers & Cruise, 1998; Rogers et al., 2010; Rogers et al., 1992; 
Rogers et al., 1991; Smith, 1997; Smith & Burger, 1997; Widows & Smith, 2005).  However, 
there is another assessment, the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM), 
which is a computer-based battery of tests designed to assess various cognitive skills (Kabat, 
Kane, Jefferson, & DiPino, 2001; Reeves, Winter, Bleiberg, & Kane, 2007).  The time required 
to administer the four ANAM scales is between 15 and 20 minutes, making it an attractive tool 
diagnosis, as well as for research purposes.  Using a computerized neurological assessment, such 
as the ANAM, may affect the outcome scores because the administration time is less and the 
measurement of the response time may be more accurate, detecting subtle changes in cognition 
(Jones, Loe, Krach, Rager, & Jones, 2008; Roebuck-Spencer, Vincent, Gilliland, Johnson, & 
Cooper, 2013).   
Presumably, the ANAM would discriminate whether an individual is malingering and 
will be sensitive to the specific behaviors of underperformance or poor effort (Reeves et al., 
2007; Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).  The ANAM’s throughput measure “has proven to be one 
of the most sensitive metrics for detecting change in performance” (Reeves et al., 2007, p. S17).  
The ANAM is frequently used for a baseline assessment (e.g., before military personnel are 
deployed overseas) and detecting Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) in the military (Johnson, 
Gilliland, K., & Vincent, 2009; Roebuck-Spencer, Vincent, Twillie, Logan, Lopez, Friedl, & 
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Gilliland, 2012; Vincent, Roebuck-Spencer, Gilliland, & Schlegel, 2012) and for sport 
concussions (Cernich, Reeves, Sun, & Bleiberg, 2007).     
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs chose the ANAM as the pre- and 
post-deployment assessment as a response to Congress requiring all U.S. Military Service 
Members to be assessed and because research has shown it is sensitive to early effects of a 
concussion (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013; United States House of Representatives H.R. 4986, 
2008).   
Motivation, Motivational Theory, and Malingering  
 Motivation is what drives people to engage in specific behaviors. There are two types of 
motivation:  intrinsic and extrinsic.  Intrinsic motivation is defined as a person’s motivation to be 
involved in an activity for its own sake (Eggen & Kauchak, 2010).  Extrinsic motivation is when 
a person is motivated to perform a behavior or engage in an activity to earn a reward or avoid a 
punishment (stimulus-response) and physiological drives (Csikszentmihalyi & Nakamura, 1989).  
Some examples of extrinsic motivation include money, tangible rewards, coercion, and/or threats 
of punishment. 
As stated above, a person can have various motivations to malinger; many researchers 
first identified malingering in the context of avoiding military service (e.g., Anderson, 2008; 
Collie, 1917; Mendelson & Mendelson, 2004; Resnick, 1994).  Collie (1917) explains that 
malingering detection was used during World War I because men wanted to escape the war.  
However, in the modern clinical setting, the incentive to malinger is often based upon avoidance 
of legal liability or the desire to obtain financial compensation or some other anticipated reward 
(Anderson, 2008; Erdal, 2009; Resnick, 1994).   
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 For example, an accused criminal may attempt malingering to avoid liability, by feigning 
incompetence to stand trial (i.e., that the criminal cannot understand the nature of the charges 
against him or aid in his defense) or by feigning insanity at the time of the criminal act (Adelman 
& Howard, 1984; Mendelson & Mendelson, 2004; Resnick, 1994).  A criminal defendant may 
also feign mental disability or diminished mental capacity which, while not rising to the level of 
a technical “defense,” may be relevant to the mitigation of the criminal act (Adelman & Howard, 
1984; Resnick, 1994).   
In addition, malingering is often suspected when an individual has a personal injury claim 
and is eligible to receive compensation, specifically once a lawsuit is filed (Anderson, 2008).  In 
addition to financial rewards and other obvious benefits described by Anderson (2008), some 
researchers suggest that individuals may falsely report or exaggerate an illness to seek the 
attention naturally paid to someone who is sick (Rogers & Payne, 2006).  Furthermore, convicted 
criminals may malinger to obtain psychiatric drugs or to be transferred from a prison to a 
psychiatric hospital (Resnick, 1994).  
Youngjohn, Davis, and Wolf (1997) studied the effects of financial compensation on 
malingering.  The participants consisted of 60 patients consisting of mild and severe head injured 
patients (Youngjohn et al., 1997).  The participants were split into three groups: 1. Nonlitigating 
severely head injured patients, 2. Litigating severely head injured patients, and 3. Litigating 
mildly head injured patients (Youngjohn et al., 1997).  The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Disorder-2 (MMPI-2) was administered to all participants (Youngjohn et al., 1997).  Youngjohn 
et al. (1997) found significant differences on the basic scales of the MMPI-2, such as the 
Schizophrenia (Sc) scale.  Litigating, both mild and severe head injured patients had greater 
elevations on the Sc scale than the nonlitigating severely head injured patients (Youngjohn et al., 
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1997).  This finding demonstrates a difference in reported pathology between participants having 
the opportunity to receive financial compensation and those who do not (Youngjohn et al., 
1997). 
In addition, Greve, Bianchini, Mathias, Houston, and Crouch (2003) studied the effects of 
financial compensation on malingering.  The participants consisted of 65 patients referred for a 
neuropsychological evaluation for mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI) (Greve et al., 2003).  
Twenty-eight of the participants met the Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999) criteria for 
“malingering of neurocognitive dysfunction” (MND) (Greve et al., 2003, p. 248).  Slick et al. 
(1999) defines MND as the “volitional exaggeration or fabrication of cognitive dysfunction for 
the purpose of material gain, or avoiding, or escaping formal duty or responsibility” (p. 552; 
Greve et al., 2003, p. 248).  Thirty-seven of the patients did not meet the Slick et al. (1999) 
criteria and were considered the control group because they did not have the opportunity to 
receive external incentives (Greve et al., 2003).  All participants completed the Wechsler 
Memory Scale (WMS) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) (Greve et al., 2003).  
The probable MND group performed significantly worse than the control group on both the 
WMS and WAIS (Greve et al., 2003).  However, the control group sustained more severe 
injuries overall in comparison to the probable MND group (Greve et al., 2003).  Therefore, the 
participants receiving external incentives were more likely to malinger neurocognitive 
dysfunction and performed more poorly on the neuropsychological assessments than participants 
who did not receive an external incentive (Greve et al., 2003).                   
Erdal (2009) explored various types of motivational influences in relation to malingering.  
In her study, the participants were given different types of motivational incentives and 
administered neuropsychological assessments (Erdal, 2009).  Participants were assigned to one 
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of the four motivational conditions (no motivation, avoiding blame, compensation, and attention-
seeking) and were instructed with additional instructions accordingly (Erdal, 2009).  All 
participants were instructed to assume the role of a person who was in a car accident which 
caused minor brain damage but after a few months start to “feel normal again” while they are 
completing the assessments (Erdal, 2009, p. 48).  The no motivation group received no additional 
instructions (Erdal, 2009).  The avoid blame group was instructed to pretend they were still 
suffering from brain damage in order to reduce financial liability and criminal repercussions 
because a jury would be “more lenient on a disabled or suffering defendant” (Erdal, 2009, p. 48).  
The compensation group was instructed to feign cognitive impairment in order to receive a large 
settlement (Erdal, 2009).  The attention seeking group were instructed to pretend they were still 
suffering from brain damage in order to continue to receive attention from friends and family 
(Erdal, 2009).   All groups completed (a) the Dot Counting Test (a participant’s responses and 
errors are assessed with task difficulty; DCT), and (b) California Verbal Learning Test 
(immediate memory span, inference, short-term and long-term retention, and recognition are 
assessed), Benton Visual Retention Test (assesses visual recall) (Erdal, 2009).  
Erdal (2009) found participants assigned to the compensation (were instructed the 
accident was another person’s fault) and attention-seeking (were instructed that the accident was 
their own fault) motivational conditions were associated with the lowest performance on all three 
assessments in comparison to participants provided instructions to avoid blame (instruction to 
avoid blame for an accident) or no motivational instructions.  The effect was similar between 
compensation-seekers and attention-seekers (Erdal, 2009).  That is, those motivated by financial 
reward performed similarly to those who desired attention (Erdal, 2009).  Thus, except for the 
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avoid blame condition, motivation to malinger for compensation or attention-seeking, 
significantly impacted test performance negatively (Erdal, 2009). 
In a similar study, Erdal (2004) found motivation and coaching altered the performance 
of simulated malingering of head injury participants.  Erdal (2004) assigned participants, 91 
introductory psychology and 34 advanced neuroscience undergraduates, to one of the three 
motivational conditions (no motivation, avoiding blame, and compensation) and one of three 
coaching conditions (no coaching, coaching post-concussive symptoms, and coaching symptoms 
plus warning malingering detection) and received additional instructions based upon group 
placement.  The no motivation and no coaching groups received no additional instructions.  The 
avoid blame group was instructed to pretend they were still suffering from brain damage to 
reduce financial liability and criminal repercussions because a jury would be “more lenient on a 
disabled or suffering defendant” (Erdal, 2004, p. 85).  The compensation group was instructed to 
feign cognitive impairment to receive a large settlement (Erdal, 2004).  The coaching post-
concussive symptoms group was instructed to feign post-concussive symptoms, such as, poor 
concentration (difficulty paying attention) and memory (remembering things, learning new 
material, and “think slower than they used to”) (Erdal, 2004, p. 85).  The coaching symptoms 
plus warning malingering detection (“coaching plus warning”) group received the same 
instruction as coaching post-concussive symptoms group and a warning that extreme 
exaggeration of symptoms are easy to detect (Erdal, 2004).  The coaching plus warning and 
compensation motivation group received the same instruction as each individual group with the 
additional instruction, if you are caught malingering, you will lose your lawsuit (Erdal, 2004).  
The coaching plus warning and avoid blame motivation group received the same instruction as 
each individual group with the additional instruction, if you are caught malingering, you will be 
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financially and criminally liable for the accident (Erdal, 2004).  The coaching post-concussive 
symptoms and avoid blame motivation group received the same instruction as each individual 
group.  The coaching post-concussive symptoms and compensation motivation group received 
the same instruction as each individual group.  All groups completed the Dot Counting Test 
(DCT), which matches each participant’s responses and errors with task difficulty evaluating 
whether there is a discrepancy.                
 Erdal (2004) found the motivation an individual has for malingering impacts the extent 
of his feigning, specifically for the motivational condition of gaining compensation.  Erdal 
(2004) theorizes people are more likely to malinger to receive a financial benefit than other 
benefits, such as, not being blamed for an accident.  Previous research indicates the explanation 
for this finding is a person becomes more of a risk-taker (i.e. malingerer) when provided the 
opportunity to gain a tangible reward (i.e. financial benefit) (Erdal, 2004).  However, a person 
being faced with avoiding a potential threat (i.e. not being blamed for an accident) is more likely 
to be more risk-averse (Erdal, 2004).   
The coaching plus warning and compensation group performed as poorly on the DCT as 
the participants in the other coaching groups (Erdal, 2004).  The possible explanation for this 
finding was that the motivation of a financial benefit was so vast, the warning not to overly 
exaggerate symptoms was negated (Erdal, 2004).  In addition, the coaching plus warning 
neutralized malingering on memory tasks but not timed tasks because the warning instruction 
only mentioned severe memory deficits as an indication of malingering (Erdal, 2004).  
Therefore, motivation can significantly affect one’s ability to successfully malinger.   
Importantly, Erdal (2004) found a significant interaction between motivation and 
coaching on the accuracy measure only, meaning the coaching plus warning and compensation 
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group were more accurate in sequencing their time pattern on the DCT.  The limitation of this 
study was the small sample size of 34 participants having knowledge of neuropsychology 
randomly assigned to 10 groups (i.e. three to four participants per group).       
However, regardless of motivation, malingering is often suspected in cases where the 
symptoms of a claimed illness or injury are subjective and not accompanied by objective, 
physical indicators (Anderson, 2008).  For example, extreme anxiety may be based mostly on 
subjective symptoms.  A discrepancy between subjective symptoms and objective indicators 
does not always indicate malingering (Rogers & Payne, 2006).  Because it requires intentional 
feigning or exaggeration of symptoms, malingering necessarily does not include chronic 
disorders that involve maladaptation. (Rogers & Payne, 2006).  The essential question is whether 
the subject’s poor adjustment is the result of authentic but ineffective coping or a dishonest effort 
to lengthen the chronic disorder (Rogers & Payne, 2006).   
Individuals may adopt certain “adjustment styles” which are not conducive to 
improvement of chronic disorders, but which are nevertheless distinct from malingering (Radley 
& Green, 1987).  In particular, pursuant to the adjustment style known as accommodation, 
individuals allow their illness to define their sense of self, becoming an ever present part of their 
identity (Rogers & Payne, 2006).  Another maladaptive adjustment style is known as resignation, 
which occurs when the individual losses his or her belief in recovery and becomes completely 
overwhelmed by the illness (Rogers & Payne, 2006).  Implicit in the distinction between 
malingering and the aforementioned maladaptive adjustments to chronic disorders is the idea that 
individuals experiencing the latter are not consciously or intentionally adopting these poor 
adjustment styles in order to feign or exaggerate their symptoms (Rogers & Payne, 2006).   
 
24 
Thus, within the concept of malingering are imbedded various constructs of motivational 
theory (Rogers & Payne, 2006).  The consideration of these constructs is important in both 
understanding malingering and assessing malingering (i.e., distinguishing malingering from 
other responses to chronic illness, which might be quite impossible without reference to internal 
mental processes) (Anderson, 2008; Constantinou & McCaffrey, 2003; Erdal, 2009; Nagle, 
Everhart, Durham, McCammon, & Walker, 2006).  In other words, because malingering is an 
intentional, motivated behavior, it is not easily understood without reference to the ideas of mind 
and consciousness, which behaviorism had cast aside as superfluous and metaphysical 
(Anderson, 2008; Constantinou & McCaffrey, 2003; Erdal, 2009; Nagle et al., 2006).   
Even though there are various implications of malingering, many professionals do not 
have more than just a general understanding of what malingering is, why people malinger, and 
how malingering can best be detected (Constantinou & McCaffrey, 2003; Nagle et al., 2006).  
For practitioners to understand malingering, they must understand how the theoretical constructs 
within motivational theory, such as, expectancy x value theory, relate to why and how people 
malinger (Anderson, 2008; Constantinou & McCaffrey, 2003; Erdal, 2009; Nagle et al., 2006).  
Expectancy x value theory combines one’s expectancy to succeed and the value placed 
on successfully achieving a given task (Atkinson, 1957; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Eccles, 
Wigfield, & Schiefele, 1998; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992, 2000).  The original expectancy x value 
theory included the interaction of three variables: expectancy, incentive, and motive (Atkinson, 
1957; Eccles et al., 1998).  An expectancy is defined as one’s belief or probability of success of 
future performance on a specific ask (Atkinson, 1957; Eccles et al., 1998).  An incentive 
represents one’s relative attractiveness of succeeding on a specific task, such as receiving a 
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reward or avoiding punishment (Atkinson, 1957; Eccles et al., 1998).  A motive is one’s capacity 
for satisfaction of acquiring a specific incentive (Atkinson, 1957).   
Modern expectancy x value theory is more complex and related to a broader variety of 
principles (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Eccles et al., 1998; Wigfield, 1994; Wigfield & Eccles, 
1992, 2000).  An individual’s perception of his own previous experiences, goals, perceived 
difficulty of a task, ability beliefs, and other social psychological influences, such as choice and 
persistence, affect an individual’s expectancies and values (Eccles et al., 1998; Wigfield & 
Eccles, 1992, 2000).  Ability beliefs differ from expectancy probability because they are defined 
as an individual’s perception about her competence on a specific task (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).  
In relation to education, Eccles et al. (1998) explained their expectancy x value model with three 
simple questions children ask themselves: “Can I do this task?” “Do I want to do this task and 
why?” and “What do I have to do succeed on this task?” (Wigfield, Eccles, Fredricks, Simpkins, 
Roeser, & Schiefele, 2015, p. 659).  If children answer “yes” to the question “Can I do this 
task?” they will put forth more effort, persist longer, achieve higher expectations, and choose 
more challenging tasks (Eggen and Kauchak, 2010, Wigfield et al., 2015).  The second question 
“Do I want to do this task?” is important because even if a person believes she can complete a 
task, it does not mean the person is motivated to do so (Wigfield et al., 2015).  The question 
“What do I have to do succeed on this task?” is related to an individual’s ability to regulate their 
behavior (Wigfield et al., 2015).   
In relation to malingering, expectancy x value theory would predict that the motivation to 
malinger is a function not only of financial incentives but also requires expectations that one can 
malinger well and will not be caught doing so.  A person may believe he or she can malinger well 
if he or she is coached or has knowledge on the specific disorder expected to be feigned.    
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Specifically, if a participant is coached on mTBI, he or she will be more confident about feigning 
mTBI because he or she will have knowledge of the symptoms.  One would therefore predict, if 
the participant is confident about completing the task (i.e. malingering well and without being 
caught) due to the effects of coaching and is provided a motivation incentive to malinger 
undetected, then he or she will put forth more effort to malinger undetected.  If this happens, the 
ANAM total accuracy scores for the coached plus motivational condition group will be 
significantly greater than chance.  Individuals without impairment typically perform in the 80th 
percentage range on many ANAM subscales (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013; Vincent et al., 2012).  
Further, individuals with known cognitive impairment typically perform significantly above the 
50th percentage range (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013; Woodhouse, J., Heyanka, D. J., Scott, J., 
Vincent, A. S.,Roebuck-Spencer,T. M.,Domboski, K., et al., 2013).  Therefore, if a person received 
significantly low—atypical—scores in total items correct, the person will be caught exhibiting 
poor effort (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013). Additionally, the ANAM-PVI scores (i.e. indicates a 
participant’s effort) will differ between the treatment groups and the control group, as the control 
group will be instructed to perform their best.  The reasoning for this prediction is outlined below.       
Coaching Malingering   
Coaching can complicate the detection of malingering. Coaching a participant can affect 
the outcome of particular measures (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009; Hickling, Taylor, Blanchard & 
Devineni, 1999; Rogers, Gillis, Bagby, & Monteiro; 1991).  In a previous study, there was a 
significant difference in the effects of coaching between identifying feigning of severe mental 
disorders as opposed to mood and anxiety disorders (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009). In another 
study, coached students achieved higher clinical elevations in simulating depression (Rogers et 
al., 1993).  
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Rogers at al. (1991) investigated whether coaching had an effect on a person’s ability to 
fake a serious mental disorder.  The participants consisted of 90 undergraduate students split into 
three groups: 1. Uncoached, 2. Coached, and 3. Control (Rogers et al., 1991).  The uncoached 
group was instructed to feign mental illness and given several minutes to prepare before SIRS 
was administered.  The coached group was instructed to feign mental illness, given a two-page 
description on feigning mental illness, and given several minutes to prepare before SIRS was 
administered.  The control group were instructed to be honest in their responses and given 
several minutes to prepare before SIRS was administered.  All participants were administered the 
SIRS.  Rogers at al. (1991) found the participants modified their responses by decreasing their 
scores on the SIRS when they were coached regarding the disorder they were trying to fake.    
Hickling et al. (1999) sought to determine whether participants could replicate answers 
associated with certain psychological disorders by coaching some participants regarding the 
diagnostic criteria for those disorders.  The participants consisted of 130 community-dwelling 
adults and students randomly assigned to one of two groups (trained or naïve) (Hickling et al., 
1999).  The trained group was coached using the DSM-IV criteria for Major Mood Disorder 
(MMD) and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Hickling et al., 1999).  The naïve (untrained) 
group were instructed to feign a psychological disorder caused by a motor vehicle accident 
(Hickling et al., 1999). All participants were instructed to complete the questionnaires as a victim 
of a motor vehicle accident would (Hickling et al., 1999).  The participants coached in the 
diagnostic criteria could simulate the symptoms of PTSD (Hickling et al., 1999).  The authors 
suggested additional studies exploring the possible effects of varying incentives to mimic 
symptoms (Hickling et al., 1999).   
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In the legal field, attorneys may coach their clients to prepare them for litigation. 
However, if an attorney, in order to strengthen a client’s case, coaches a client to change his 
behavior in an examination for a more favorable outcome, then the attorney would be engaged in 
diagnosing coaching (Gutheil, 2003).   Diagnosing coaching is a serious ethical violation on 
behalf of the attorney (Gutheil, 2003).  Under the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 
1.2(d), “a lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer 
knows is criminal or fraudulent.”  Improperly coaching a client can arguably be considered fraud 
and an attorney may be disciplined.  However, coaching may be unconscious, with the attorney’s 
guidance “inadvertently slipping over the line” (Gutheil, 2003, p. 9).  In this case, the attorney 
would not be intentionally coaching the client to change his behavior, and would therefore not be 
committing fraud.  In some circumstances, it may be difficult to determine whether an attorney 
intentionally coaches a client to change his behavior.     
Because of the prevalence of coaching and the significance coaching can have upon 
successful malingering, more research could be used in this subject area, with respect to the 
interaction, if any, between motivational condition and coaching.  
Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
In 2012, traumatic brain injury (TBI) was estimated to occur in approximately 1.7 million 
individuals in the United States yearly (The CDC, NIH, DoD, and VA Leadership Panel, 2013).  
Approximately 80% of these injuries were diagnosed as mild TBI (mTBI) (The CDC, NIH, 
DoD, and VA Leadership Panel, 2013).  The most widely used tests to assess the degree (mild, 
moderate, or severe) of TBI are the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) and computed tomography (CT) 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015).  The GCS uses the following criteria to 
classify the severity of a TBI as mild:  1. Loss of consciousness less than 30 minutes, 2. Zero to 
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one day of post-traumatic amnesia, 3. Glasgow Coma Scale score of 13 to 15, 4. Normal 
Structural Imaging, and 5. Abbreviated Injury Scale score: Head of one to two (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2015).  Adults with mTBI perform more poorly on measures of 
memory, processing speed, and poor concentration (Sours, C., Rosenberg, J., Kane, R., Roys, S., 
Zhuo, J., Shanmuganathan, K., & Gullapalli, R. P., 2015).  Previous research has indicated 
probable malingering is estimated in 30 to 40 percent of mTBI cases where an external incentive 
(compensation) is to be gained (Larrabee, 2003; Larrabee, Millis, & Meyers, 2009).   
Effort and Malingering 
Effort is a part of malingering (Iverson, 2007).  Definite Malingering occurs when poor 
effort (i.e. below chance performance) that is clear and convincing is shown while testing 
(Iverson, 2007, p. 131).  Green, Rohling, Lees-Haley, and Allen (2001) determined lack of effort 
explained approximately 50% of the variance in all test scores. The ANAM Performance 
Validity Indicator (ANAM-PVI) was designed to detect poor effort while completing the 
assessment (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).  The two measures used to calculate the ANAM-PVI 
score are accuracy in response and response time (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).  The ANAM 
subscales use a two-choice response task (Cognitive Science Research Center, 2014; Roebuck-
Spencer et al., 2013). The test taker can either left or right click the mouse when deciding 
between one of the two answers (Cognitive Science Research Center, 2014).  Thus, a range of 
scores around 50 percent correct reflects chance responding (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).   As 
previously stated, it is predicted that a participant intentionally exhibiting poor effort will 
respond significantly below 50 percent (i.e. significantly below chance responding) in total items 
correct (i.e. accuracy) on the subscales (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).  In regards to response 
time, studies have shown participants attempting to feign cognitive impairment will typically 
 
30 
slow their response time (Bolan, Foster, Schmand, & Bolan, 2002; Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013; 
Tan, Slick, Strauss, & Hultsch, 2002).  It is theorized that people who are intentionally faking 
cognitive impairment will respond much slower than a person with a clinical diagnosis of 
cognitive impairment (Van Gorp et al., 1999).  Another theory is that people who are 
intentionally faking cognitive impairment need more time to change their decision about 
responding to a test item (Bolan et al., 2002).  For example, if a non-impaired adult is asked the 
answer to the problem 2 plus 2, he or she will automatically think 4.  If the non-impaired adult is 
asked to answer the same a math problem as a person with a brain injury, he or she will take 
more time to answer because the correct answer will be thought of first and then he or she must 
choose the incorrect answer.  In comparing the response time and accuracy scores to a reference 
group, the ANAM-PVI calculates the test-taker’s effort while testing (Cognitive Science 
Research Center, 2014; Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).  If a person scores within the outpatient 
reference group threshold (scores equal to or less than 14), he or she will be inside the range of a 
person putting forth optimal effort (Cognitive Science Research Center, 2014).  
 Roebuck-Spencer et al. (2013) studied the ANAM-PVI to validate measure and to create 
cut-points to minimize potential false-positive errors.  One group of participants included 60 
patients (93% men) diagnosed with an acquired brain injury (“patients”)(Roebuck-Spencer et al., 
2013).  Other participant data were taken from the control and simulator groups in the initial 
simulation study (Johnson et al., 2009; Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).  Participants in these 
groups did not have a clinical diagnosis of TBI.  The simulator group was told to feign a brain 
injury (Johnson et al., 2009); the control group was not.   Roebuck-Spencer et al. (2013) found 
the ANAM-PVI scores differed among the three groups.  The simulator group scored 
significantly higher (i.e. worse) on the ANAM-PVI than both the control and patient groups 
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(Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).  Roebuck-Spencer et al. (2013) also found ANAM-PVI cut off 
scores should be greater than or equal to five to be appropriate for healthy participants. However, 
it is recommended that the ANAM-PVI cut off scores should be greater than or equal to 10 for 
patients with known cognitive impairment to reduce false positive errors (Roebuck-Spencer et 
al., 2013).  
The limitations of this study included (a) the use of simulated rather than real-world 
incentives, (b) the participants were primarily male, (c) no baseline scores were used to assess 
changes in a participant’s cognitive performance (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).  The use of 
simulated incentives may not provide the external motivation needed for college students to 
feign poor performance (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).  Therefore, the current study used real-
world incentives to motivate the college student participants with a secondary gain for feigning 
poor performance.  Additionally, baseline scores were assessed to observe changes in a 
participant’s cognitive performance.        
Study Focus and Research Questions   
Despite increased understanding of malingering, there are still a variety of areas in which 
more research is needed.  Many studies about malingering address the issue of motivation (Erdal, 
2009; Erdal, 2004; Greve et al., 2003; Larrabee, 2003; Youngjohn et al., 1997).  People who are 
motivated to feign a disorder would go to great lengths to learn about the particular disorder they 
are trying to emulate (Erdal, 2009).  Within the construct of motivation, such studies try to 
explain why people would want to malinger, as well as whether motivation is correlated with 
successful malingering.  Other studies look at how well people malinger depending on whether 
or not they have been coached in the diagnostic criteria for various mental disorders (Bagby et 
al., 2002; Bowen & Brant, 2006; Guriel-Tennant & Fremouw, 2006; Rogers et al., 1993; Rogers 
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et al., 1991; Rogers, Jackson, Sewell, & Salekin, 2005). These studies found coaching can 
modify the participant’s response to the measure (Bagby, et al., 2002; Bowen & Brant, 2006; 
Guriel-Tennant & Fremouw, 2006; Rogers, et al., 1993; Rogers et al., 1991; Rogers, et al., 
2005). One would expect coaching to be more effective when the individual is motivated, and 
motivational rewards to be more effective when an individual has the knowledge and skills to 
malinger.  Expectancy x value theory in fact posits such an interaction.  As previously stated, 
expectancy x value theory combines one’s expectancy to succeed and the value placed on 
successfully achieving a given task (Atkinson, 1957; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Eccles, Wigfield, 
& Schiefele, 1998; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992, 2000).  Therefore, if an individual is motivated to 
successfully malinger on an assessment (or places value on successfully completing the task) and 
is provided with the knowledge to successfully malinger to increase an individual’s expectancy 
to succeed, then it is predicted the individual will put forth more effort (Eggen & Kauchak, 2010, 
Wigfield et al., 2015).           
Both motivation and knowledge of disorders should be considered when trying to detect 
malingering.  It would seem that people who are the most motivated to feign a disorder would go 
to great lengths to learn about the particular disorder they are trying to emulate.  For example, 
someone who has the potential of getting a jury settlement of one million dollars by convincing 
his doctor, and ultimately a jury, that he has suffered from extreme pain after a car accident is 
probably going to try to learn as much as he could about the pain disorder he is trying to 
manifest.  He is also likely to seek coaching from someone who knows about this disorder, and 
he may seek coaching from his attorney.   
The current study sought to apply expectancy x value theory to explain and replicate the 
finding that receiving a motivational incentive and coaching (i.e., providing information about 
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mTBI symptoms) will significantly impact test performance.  However, different from previous 
research, the motivation incentive provided was a tangible incentive (compensation, e.g. $50 gift 
card lottery) rather than the more common simulated one.  The limitations of Erdal (2004, 2009) 
studies included using simulated rather than real-world incentives.  It is possible participants 
would put forth greater effort to malinger undetected if they received a tangible incentive.   
 Additionally, Erdal (2004) had a small sample size of 34 participants having knowledge 
of neuropsychology randomly assigned to 10 groups (i.e. three to four participants per group) 
and was not able to determine which knowledge (i.e. previous knowledge versus knowledge 
gained from the coaching instructions) had an effect on the results.  Erdal (2004, 2009) did not 
include baseline scores assessed before the participants were presented with the intervention.  It 
is possible that participants would have scored the same on the assessment regardless of the 
condition randomly assigned, meaning, the effect did not come from the treatment.  Also, the 
purpose of baseline scores or pre-test scores is to test for the presence of selection effects, i.e., 
whether there are significant initial differences between the groups.  Therefore, the study 
included a larger sample size (27 participants per group), assessed baseline scores of all 
participants, and assessed knowledge as a covariate.  The baseline scores of all participants were 
assessed by having the participants complete two administrations of the assessments in the study.  
As a result, time (pre- and post- treatment) was considered as a factor in this study.   
The research questions addressed in this study are: 
5) Is there a significant difference in performance between treatment and control 
groups on the pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
6) Is there a significant difference in performance between treatment and control 
groups on the post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
 
34 
7) Do participants in the treatment groups (i.e. instructed to feign mTBI 
symptoms) differ in their ANAM Effort Measure in comparison to control? 
8) Are there positive interactions between the motivation and coached 
conditions? 
Based on the literature, the following hypotheses were made:  
5) There will be a significant difference in performance between treatment and 
control groups on the pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy scores. 
Specifically, the coaching plus motivational incentive and coaching conditions 
will decrease the ANAM total accuracy scores (feigning clinical mTBI) 
between the pre- and post-. The degree to which the ANAM total accuracy 
scores will be differentially influenced by coaching and motivation is 
exploratory.   
6) There will be a significant difference in performance between treatment and 
control groups on the post- ANAM total accuracy scores. Specifically, the 
coaching plus motivational incentive and coaching conditions will have lower 
ANAM total accuracy scores (feigning clinical mTBI) than the other groups. 
The degree to which the ANAM total accuracy scores will be differentially 
influenced by coaching and motivation is exploratory.   
7) The participants who are trained to malinger mTBI will differ in their ANAM 
Effort Measure in comparison to control. 
8) There will be a positive interaction between the motivation and coached 
conditions.  
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This study contributed to the research literature by providing additional information on 
the interaction between motivation and coaching in regards to simulating mTBI symptoms.  In 
addition, currently, there is no research on the interaction between motivation and coaching and 
their effects in simulating mTBI on the ANAM.  Therefore, the results of this study aid in 
determining whether there is a statistically significant interaction between coaching and 
motivation in general and while using the ANAM.   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 162 undergraduates and graduates enrolled in different sections of 
an educational psychology course.  The participants were drawn from a large university in the 
southwest; they were drawn from a subject pool and participated to satisfy a course requirement 
(participation was graded credit/no-credit). 
The characteristics of the final sample were as follows:  The participants were primarily 
graduate students (53%), but 22% were juniors, 14% were sophomores, 8% were seniors, 2% 
were freshman.  Of the participants, 65% were women and 46% were Caucasian; the remainder 
were Hispanic/Latino (22%), Asian American (12%), African American (12%), and multiple 
race (7%).  Ages ranged from 18 to 60 (mean age was 27.63).  GPA ranged from 2.2 to 4.0 
(mean GPA was 3.48). Most of the participants were in an education graduate program (40%) or 
majoring in education (37%).  
Materials 
Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics. The Automated 
Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM) is a computer-based battery of tests designed 
to assess various cognitive skills but is not a clinical diagnostic tool (Kabat, Kane, Jefferson, & 
DiPino, 2001). Rather, it should be thought of as a screening tool to identify individuals for 
additional testing and diagnosis. It should be noted that these other tools and procedures are also 
susceptible to feigning. The ANAM battery used for this investigation consisted of four scales 
which are required to produce the performance validity index score. Each scale yields four 
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scores: accuracy (percentage of correct responses given by the participant), response time (mean 
response time for correct responses given), efficiency/throughput (combination of accuracy and 
speed) and the ANAM Performance Validity Indicator (ANAM-PVI) score.  The scale 
descriptions are as follows: 
1. Simple Reaction Time: This classic reaction time task requires participants to respond 
immediately, by clicking the left mouse button, to the presence of a stimulus (*) on 
the computer screen. There is a total of 25 stimuli presented on the screen with a 
maximum of 9000 milliseconds allowed for response. 
2. Matching to Sample:  This task is designed to assess the participant's ability to 
quickly and accurately choose a test stimulus, by clicking the left or right mouse 
button, which is identical to the stimulus presented 5 seconds previously 
(checkerboard matrix) on the computer screen. There is a total of 15 stimuli presented 
on the screen with a maximum of 8600 milliseconds allowed for response. The test 
taps short-term spatial memory and pattern recognition skills. 
3. Procedural Reaction Time: This task presents stimuli (numbers 2,3,4, and 5) on the 
computer screen, one at a time. The participant is requested to respond by clicking the 
left mouse button if the stimulus is “low” (2 or 3), and the right mouse button if the 
stimulus is “high: (4 or 5). There is a total of 37 stimuli presented on the screen for up 
to 8000 milliseconds with a maximum of 9000 milliseconds allowed for response. 
4. Code Substitution-Learning: This task presents stimuli (codes consisting of nine 
symbols paired with nine digits) on the computer screen. The participant is requested 
to review the code and decide if a pairing presented below the code is consistent with 
the code above and click the left mouse button for a correct pairing and right mouse 
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button for incorrect pairing. There is a total of 36 stimuli presented on the screen with 
a maximum of 9000 milliseconds allowed for response. 
Please see Appendix II for examples of each subscale. Generally, a lower score on 
Matching-to Sample and Code Substitution-Learning is evidence of brain injury, as would longer 
simple and procedural reaction times.  Short reaction times in conjunction with low performance 
is evidence of feigning.      
The ANAM was designed to be immediately repeated (Kabat et al., 2001).  Each time the 
ANAM is administered, the items are randomized, thus preventing a practice effect causing 
participants to have an advantage during the second administration of the ANAM (Jones, Loe, 
Krach, Rager, & Jones, 2008; Kabat et al., 2001).  The ANAM was administered by computer in 
a classroom setting as per the instructions published in its manual.  There are several studies 
supporting the construct validity of ANAM which indicate strong concordance between the 
ANAM and traditional neuropsychological measures (Bleiberg, Kane, Reeves, Garmoe, & 
Halpern, 2000; Vincent et al., 2012; Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013).   
Demographics Questionnaire.  The Demographics questionnaire consisted of seven 
items, including demographic information (e.g. age, gender, major, etc.) and knowing someone 
with a diagnosis of Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI).  Please see Appendix III.  
Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Symptoms Checklist.  The mTBI Symptoms Checklist 
is a self-report questionnaire designed to measure Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) 
symptoms a person would exhibit as a result of a head injury.  The mTBI Symptoms Checklist 
consists of 21 symptoms on a scale from 0 (Not Present) to 6 (Severe). Subsumed within these 
21 symptoms are 12 symptoms that make up the Concussion Symptom Inventory (Randolph, C., 
Millis, S., Barr, W., McCreae, M., Guskiewicz, K., Hammeke, T., et al., 2009).  For example, 
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one question asks participants, if the symptom is present now, please rate the severity of the 
symptom “Easily distracted.” Please see Appendix IV for the additional questions.     
Design and Procedure 
University students from the Department of Educational Psychology and Higher 
Education’s subject pool volunteered for this study to fulfill a general research requirement in 
their classes.  Participants were made aware that they can withdraw from participation at any 
time without penalty.  Students received credit for participating regardless of their performance 
in this study.  Testing was completed in one phase.  The on-campus session took between 45 and 
60 minutes.   
At the beginning of the in-person session, all participants were asked to review and 
complete consent forms.  Once completed, all participants completed a short demographic 
survey.  Then, all participants were instructed to pretend they were exhibiting mTBI symptoms 
while completing the mTBI Symptoms Checklist.     
All participants completed four Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics 
(ANAM) scales which were as follows: 1. Simple Reaction Time, 2. Matching to the Sample, 3. 
Procedural Reaction Time, and 4. Code Substitution-Learning. These served as a baseline.  All 
participants were told to give their best effort during the first administration of the assessments.    
Then, the participants were randomly assigned into six groups.  Group 1 was assigned the 
coached plus warning instruction and informed if they can “successfully” feign mTBI during the 
second administration of the assessments, they would receive the incentive.  Group 2 was 
assigned the coached instruction and informed if they can “successfully” feign mTBI during the 
second administration of the assessments, they would receive the incentive.  Group 3 was 
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assigned the uncoached instruction and told if they can “successfully” feign mTBI during the 
second administration of the assessments, they would receive the incentive.  Group 4 was 
assigned the coached plus warning instruction and told to feign mTBI symptoms with no 
incentive during the second administration of the assessments.  Group 5 was assigned the 
coached instruction and told to feign mTBI symptoms with no incentive during the second 
administration of the assessments.  Group 6 (optimal performance group/control) was told to 
give their best effort during the second administration of the assessments.     
Group 1 (Coached + Warning/Incentive) will be as follows:  
For the following task, using the attachment provided, I want you to alter your 
performance to appear as though you should be diagnosed with Mild Traumatic 
Brain Injury (mTBI). 
I want you to pretend about a month ago you were in a car accident, and you hit 
your head. You were knocked out. When you woke up, the doctors told you that 
you had suffered a brain injury from the accident. You were hospitalized 
overnight for observation and then released.  
You will be eligible for participation in a $50 gift card lottery if you can:  
(1) be identified, based on your symptoms, as a person having mTBI, and  
(2) avoid being identified as faking the disorder.   
To avoid being identified as faking, do not exaggerate your symptoms too 
much. For example, if you incorrectly answer all the questions or answer the 
questions too slowly, the assessment will detect you as a faking a brain injury. 
Please put forth your best effort to pretend you have mTBI. 
Group 2 (Coached/Incentive) will be as follows:  
For the following task, using the attachment provided, I want you to alter your 
performance to appear as though you should be diagnosed with Mild Traumatic 
Brain Injury (mTBI).  
I want you to pretend about a month ago you were in a car accident, and you hit 
your head. You were knocked out. When you woke up, the doctors told you that 
you had suffered a brain injury from the accident. You were hospitalized 
overnight for observation and then released. 
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You will be eligible for participation in a $50 gift card lottery if you can:  
(1) be identified, based on your symptoms, as a person having mTBI, and  
(2) avoid being identified as faking the disorder.   
Please put forth your best effort to pretend you have mTBI.  
Group 3 (Uncoached/Incentive) will be as follows:  
For the following task, I want you to alter your performance to appear as though 
you should be diagnosed with Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI).  
I want you to pretend about a month ago you were in a car accident, and you hit 
your head. You were knocked out. When you woke up, the doctors told you that 
you had suffered a brain injury from the accident. You were hospitalized 
overnight for observation and then released.  
You will be eligible for participation in a $50 gift card lottery if you can:  
(1) be identified, based on your symptoms, as a person having mTBI, and  
(2) avoid being identified as faking the disorder.   
Please put forth your best effort to pretend you have mTBI.  
Group 4 (Coached +Warning /No incentive) will be as follows:  
For the following task, using the attachment provided, I want you to alter your 
performance to appear as though you should be diagnosed with Mild Traumatic 
Brain Injury (mTBI).  
I want you to pretend about a month ago you were in a car accident, and you hit 
your head. You were knocked out. When you woke up, the doctors told you that 
you had suffered a brain injury from the accident. You were hospitalized 
overnight for observation and then released.  
To avoid being identified as faking, do not exaggerate your symptoms too 
much. For example, if you incorrectly answer all the questions or answer the 
questions too slowly, the assessment will detect you as a faking a brain injury.  
Please put forth your best effort to pretend you have mTBI. 
Group 5 (Coached/No incentive) will be as follows:  
For the following tasks, using the attachment provided, I want you to alter your 
performance to appear as though you should be diagnosed with Mild Traumatic 
Brain Injury (mTBI).   
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I want you to pretend about a month ago you were in a car accident, and you hit 
your head. You were knocked out. When you woke up, the doctors told you that 
you had suffered a brain injury from the accident. You were hospitalized 
overnight for observation and then released. 
Please put forth your best effort to pretend you have mTBI.  
Group 6 (Optimal Performance) will be as follows: 
For the following tasks, I want you to give your best effort.  
Groups 1, 2, 4 and 5 received a one-page document including several mTBI symptoms 
listed in the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Please see Appendix V.    
Similar to Nagle et al. (2006) and Erdal (2004), Groups 1, 2, and 3 instructions 
emphasized to participants, the simulated incentive they could receive is directly related to their 
efforts at feigning mTBI.  In addition, the participants were eligible for an actual incentive for 
participation (i.e a $50 gift card lottery).  To comply with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
requirements, all participants were eligible for the incentive after completion of the study.  Thus, 
a small amount of deception was used. 
Once the instructions were read, the mTBI Symptoms Checklist and the four ANAM 
scales were re-administered, respectively.  
The experiment used a 2 x 3 x 2 mixed factorial repeated measures design, with a 
coached condition (coached plus warning, coached, not coached) as one factor, a motivational 
incentive) goal (versus no goal) as the second factor, and time as the third factor (see Table 1).   
The independent variables were whether the participant received the coached plus warning, 
coached, or uncoached instruction, whether the participant received the motivational (incentive) 
goal instruction, and time (pre- post- administration).  The dependent variables included the total 
accuracy (i.e. total percentage correct) scores of the four ANAM subscales and the ANAM 
Performance Validity Indicator (ANAM-PVI) score (Effort Measure).  Although the ANAM 
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does not have an embedded malingering scale, the ANAM Effort Measure scores were used for 
evaluating the validity of scores.  Any values rated as poor effort (i.e. scores 14 and above) on 
the ANAM Effort Measure were considered a detection of malingering due to lack of effort 
while completing the assessment.   
 
Table 1 
Study Design (2 x 3 x 2 Mixed Factorial) 
 Motivational Goal 
(Incentive) 
No Motivational Goal 
(No incentive) 
Coached + Warning 
condition 
Pre- v. Post-treatment  Pre- v. Post-treatment  
Coached condition Pre- v. Post-treatment  Pre- v. Post-treatment  
Not coached condition Pre- v. Post-treatment  (Control Group) 
Pre- v. Post- 
(no treatment) 
Note. Time (pre- v. post-treatment) is the third factor.  
 
As previously stated, both motivation and coaching should be considered when trying to 
detect malingering since a participant can modify their responses to an assessment based on 
those factors. Unlike previous research, this study used a tangible incentive (compensation, e.g. 
$50 gift card lottery) rather than the more common simulated one, in combination with a 
coaching instruction (i.e., providing information about mTBI symptoms) plus warning (i.e., 
instructed to not exaggerate the symptoms too much) to determine if there was an impact on test 
performance.   
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Analysis 
Analysis of group performance on the ANAM were completed with separate analyses, as 
follows:  
Research Question 1: Is there a significant difference in performance between treatment 
and control groups on the pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
A 2 motivational goal (incentive v. no incentive) x 3 coached condition (coached plus 
warning, coached, not coached) x 2 time (pre- versus post- ANAM total accuracy scores) Mixed 
Factorial Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted to compare pre- and post-ANAM total 
scores.  
Research Question 2: Is there a significant difference in performance between treatment 
and control groups on the post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
A 2 motivational goal (incentive v. no incentive) x 3 coached condition (coached plus 
warning, coached, not coached) Mixed Factorial ANOVA was conducted to compare post-
ANAM total scores. 
Research Question 3: Do participants in the treatment groups (i.e. instructed to feign 
mTBI symptoms) differ in their ANAM Effort Measure in comparison to control?  
Although the ANAM reports continuous scores for the Effort Measure, the ANAM rates 
values as poor effort (i.e. lack of effort while completing the assessment) as scores 14 and above.  
Lack of effort is used to identify possible feigning. If the ANAM Effort Measure score is 14 and 
above, the ANAM marks the scores as questionable and invalid.  Therefore, the ANAM 
continuous scores were converted to dichotomous scores (i.e. optimal effort v. sub-optimal 
effort).  For this reason, a logistic regression was conducted to verify which factors help predict 
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whether a participant will put forth effort during ANAM administration using coaching and 
motivation as predictors. 
Research Question 4: Are there positive interactions between the motivation and 
coached conditions on the ANAM total accuracy scores?  
4a. Are there positive interactions between the motivation and coached conditions 
between treatment and control groups on the pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy scores?  
A 2 motivational goal (incentive v. no incentive) x 3 coached condition (coached plus 
warning, coached, not coached) x 2 time (pre- versus post- ANAM total accuracy scores) Mixed 
Factorial Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted to compare pre- and post-ANAM total 
scores.  
4b. Are there positive interactions between the motivation and coached conditions 
between treatment and control groups on the post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
A 2 motivational goal (incentive v. no incentive) x 3 coached condition (coached plus 
warning, coached, not coached) Mixed Factorial ANOVA was conducted to compare post-
ANAM total scores. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Examination of Data 
 Preliminary Analysis. Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of participants 
overall and by group.  One-way ANOVAs revealed no significant differences among groups (all 
ps > 0.05) in respect to age (F(5,155) = 1.24, p = 0.294) or GPA (F(5,156) = 1.21, p = 0.306). In 
addition, participants did not differ among groups for ethnicity (χ 2(10) = 18.07, p = 0.054), grade 
level (χ 2(5) = 2.88, p = 0.719), and gender (χ 2(5) = 10.70, p = 0.058).  For categorical variables, 
Table 3 presents the frequency counts and percentages of participants overall and by group.  
Participants did not differ between Motivation (χ 2(7) = 12.20, p = 0.094) or Coached (χ 2(14) = 
11.88, p = 0.616) conditions by ethnicity.  The participants did not differ between Motivation 
(χ 2(4) = 7.32, p = 0.120) and Coached (χ 2(8) = 7.74, p = 0.459) conditions by grade level.  Lastly, 
the participants did not differ between Coached conditions (χ 2(2) = 1.04, p = 0.595) by gender.  
The participants did differ between Motivation and No Motivation groups (χ 2(1) = 6.99, p = 
0.008) for gender. The proportion of women 
 who were in the motivation condition (75.31%) was greater than the proportion of women in 
the no motivation condition (55.56%). In addition, the proportion of men in the no motivation 
condition (44.44%) was greater than the proportion of men in the motivation condition (24.69%). 
A follow-up test using a Bonferroni correction indicated that the proportion of women in the 
motivation condition differed significantly from the proportion of women in the no motivation 
condition (χ 2(2) = -6.97, p = 0.008). Similarly, the proportion of men in the motivation condition 
differed significantly from the proportion of men in the no motivation condition (χ 2(2) = -6.97, p 
= 0.008). Overall, these results suggest that more women are represented in the motivation 
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condition when coaching is not considered. This poses a small threat to internal validity, an issue 
that will be taken up in the Discussion. However, as stated above, when examining the individual 
six groups, the participants did not differ for gender. In addition, follow-up analyses indicated that 
gender did not have an effect on ANAM performance, F(1, 160) = 0.14, p = .708.  
Table 2 
Means (SDs) of Demographic Characteristics Overall and by Group 
 Overall 
n = 162 
Control 
n = 27 
Group 1 
n = 27 
Group 2 
n = 27 
Group 3 
n = 27 
Group 4 
n = 27 
Group 5 
n = 27 
Age 27.63 (9.21) 25.26 (8.96) 28.89 (10.62) 25.07 (5.24) 28.19 (8.16) 29.04 (10.14) 29.33 (10.80) 
Cumulative 
GPA 
3.48 (0.45) 3.42 (0.46) 3.65 (0.38) 3.48 (0.43) 3.47 (0.47) 3.48 (0.52) 3.35 (0.46) 
 
Note. Group 1 = coached plus warning instruction and motivation incentive, Group 2 = coached instruction and motivation 
incentive, Group 3 = uncoached instruction and motivation incentive, Group 4 = coached plus warning instruction and no 
motivation incentive, Group 5 = coached instruction and no motivation incentive, and Control = uncoached instruction and no 
motivation incentive or control.  
 
 
Finally, a one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences groups on the pre-test overall 
(total) accuracy scores (p > .05).  This is evidence against differential selection as a threat to 
internal validity. 
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Table 3 
Frequency Counts (Percentages) of Demographic Characteristics Overall and by Group 
 Overall 
n = 162 
Control 
n = 27 
Group 1 
n = 27 
Group 2 
n = 27 
Group 3 
n = 27 
Group 4 
n = 27 
Group 5 
n = 27 
Gender        
Male 56 (34.6%) 11 (40.7%) 5 (18.5%) 5 (18.5%) 10 (37.0%) 11 (40.7%) 14 (51.9%) 
Female 106 (65.4%) 16 (59.3%) 22 (81.5%) 22 (81.5%) 17 (63.0%) 16 (59.3%) 13 (48.1%) 
Ethnicity        
Caucasian 72 (44.4%) 8 (29.6%) 13 (48.1%) 10 (37.7%) 16 (59.3%) 11 (40.7%) 14 (51.9%) 
Hispanic 35 (21.6%) 12 (44.4%) 8 (29.6%) 4 (14.8%) 3 (11.1%) 5 (18.5%) 3 (11.1%) 
Other 55 (34.0%) 6 (10.9%) 13 (23.6%) 8 (14.5%) 11 (20.0%) 10 (18.2%) 7 (12.7%) 
Education Level        
Undergraduate 76 (46.9%) 13 (17.1%) 13 (17.1%) 16 (21.1%) 12 (15.8%) 10 (13.2%) 12 (15.8%) 
Graduate 86 (53.1%) 14 (51.9%) 14 (51.9%) 11 (40.7%) 15 (55.6%) 17 (63.0%) 15 (55.6%) 
Note. Group 1 = coached plus warning instruction and motivation incentive, Group 2 = coached instruction and motivation 
incentive, Group 3 = uncoached instruction and motivation incentive, Group 4 = coached plus warning instruction and no 
motivation incentive, Group 5 = coached instruction and no motivation incentive, and Control = uncoached instruction and no 
motivation incentive or control.  
  
 Normality.  A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was performed for each dependent 
measure. The following variables were significant, suggesting the data for these measures did not 
follow a normal distribution: The overall (total) accuracy scores at both pretest (W = .88, p < 
0.001) and posttest (W = .96, p < 0.001).  To further examine the normality, skewness and 
kurtosis was evaluated for each dependent measure.  As can be seen in Table 4 (below), the 
overall (total) accuracy scores were within acceptable limits for normality, with range of 
skewness being between -1.5 and 1.5 (range of skewness = -1.23 to -0.54; Field, 2013; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The overall (total) accuracy scores were within acceptable limits for 
normality, with range of kurtosis being between -1.5 and 1.5 (range of kurtosis = -0.21 to 0.94; 
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Field, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In addition, histograms were used to assess normality 
(Cohen et al., 2003). As seen in Figure 1, there is no significant departure from normality. 
Therefore, the assumption of normality has been met. Furthermore, based on the central limit 
theorem, the assumption of normality is usually met if the sample size is large enough (i.e. n > 
30).  
 
Table 4.      
Skewness and Kurtosis for ANAM Total Accuracy Scores by Time   
 
 
 Pretest   Posttest   
  Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis 
Overall (Total) Accuracy -1.23 0.94 -0.54 -0.21 
 
Note. Total Accuracy, total percentage of correct responses on the CDS, M2S, and PRO.  
 
  
 
Figure 1. Histograms of Overall (Total) Pre- and Post- Accuracy Scores 
 
       
Outliers. Univariate outliers were assessed by examining boxplots. The boxplots 
detected no extreme cases found in the pre- and post-tests for total accuracy scores.   
 
50 
Descriptive Statistics  
All means and standard deviations for all DVs (pre-post total accuracy scores) are 
presented in Table 5.  As can be seen in the table, the ANAM total accuracy scores decreased 
from pre- (M = 89.04, SD = 8.70) to post-test (M = 78.88, SD = 13.60).  As mentioned above, 
the SRT subscale accuracy scores were removed from total accuracy scores data analysis based 
on the high means (99% correct out of 100%) for both pre- and post-test, indicating the subscale 
was too easy for participants to complete and would be an inaccurate measure to determine the 
effects on motivation and coaching in this study.   
 
Table 5.      
Means and Standard Deviations for Accuracy on ANAM Overall by Time  
 
 
 Pre-test   Post-test   
  M SD M SD 
Overall (Total) Accuracy 89.04 8.70 78.88 13.60 
Note. Total Accuracy, total percentage of correct responses on the CDS, M2S, and PRO ANAM Subscales.  
 
Research Question 1: Is there a significant difference in performance between treatment 
and control groups on the pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
To explore whether coaching and motivational incentive influenced participants ANAM 
total accuracy scores over time, a 2 (Motivation) x 3 (Coached) x 2 (Time) Mixed Factorial 
Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted to compare pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy 
scores.  Based on Levene’s F tests, the homogeneity of variance assumption was satisfied for 
Time 1 (F(5, 156) = 1.00, p = 0.420) and Time 2 F(5, 156)= 1.33, p = 0.255).  The results 
revealed a significant three-way interaction between the Motivation and Coached groups on the 
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ANAM total accuracy measure from Pre to Post, Wilk's Λ = 0.905, F(2, 156) = 8.12, p < .001,η𝑝𝑝2   
= 0.095, indicating a moderate effect (Cohen, 1988; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Pairwise comparisons revealed the No Motivation x Coached performance significantly 
decreased from pre-ANAM (M = 90.32, SD = 8.18) to post-ANAM (M = 72.83, SD = 11.14) 
total accuracy scores. The No Motivation x Coached plus Warning condition also significantly 
decreased from pre-ANAM (M = 89.73, SD = 8.59) to post-ANAM (M = 80.70, SD = 14.83) 
total accuracy scores. The No Motivation x Uncoached (Control) condition did not differ 
significantly from pre- (M = 88.77, SD = 8.48) to post- (M = 90.08, SD = 8.81) on the ANAM 
total accuracy scores.  
For the Motivation conditions, the Motivation x Uncoached performance significantly 
decreased from pre-ANAM (M = 87.90, SD = 8.36) to post-ANAM (M = 72.19, SD = 13.32) 
total accuracy scores. The Motivation x Coached performance significantly decreased from pre-
ANAM (M = 90.05, SD = 8.50) to post-ANAM (M = 75.12, SD = 13.57) total accuracy scores. 
Finally, the Motivation x Coached plus Warning condition performance significantly decreased 
from pre-ANAM (M = 87.45, SD = 10.34) to post-ANAM (M = 80.35, SD = 12.30) total 
accuracy scores. See Table 6 for Means and Standard Deviations of Pre- and Post-test ANAM 
total accuracy scores.  
In summary, there were significant decreases in all conditions except the control 
condition (No Motivation and Uncoached), thus explaining the three-way interaction. 
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Table 6.      
Means and Standard Deviations of ANAM Pre- and Post-test Total Accuracy Scores 
 Pretest   Posttest   
  M SD M SD 
Uncoached (C1) x No Motivation (M1) (Control) 88.77 8.48 90.08 8.81 
Coached (C2) x M1 90.32 8.18 72.83 11.14 
Coached plus Warning (C3) x M1 89.73 8.59 80.70 14.83 
C1 x Motivation (M2) 87.90 8.36 72.19 13.32 
C2 x M2 90.05 8.50 75.12 13.57 
C3 x M2 87.45 10.34 80.35 12.30 
Note: M1 = No Motivation Incentive, M2 = Motivation Incentive, C1 = Uncoached Instruction  
C2 = Coached Instruction, C3 = Coached plus Warning Instruction 
 
 
Although main effects and two-way interactions should generally not be interpreted (or 
interpreted cautiously) in the presence of a higher order interaction, the results are presented here 
for completeness.  The results from the two-way interactions revealed significant differences 
between the Coaching x Time on the ANAM total score measure from Pre to Post, Wilk's Λ = 
0.893, F(2, 156) = 9.34, p < .001, ηp² = 0.107, indicating a moderate effect (Cohen, 1988; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, the interaction of Motivation x Time on the ANAM total 
score measure from Pre to Post ANAM was nonsignificant, Wilk's Λ = 0.981, F(2, 156) = 3.07, p 
= 0.082, ηp² = 0.019. 
The main effect of time was significant, Wilk's Λ = .605, F(1, 156) = 102.04, p < .001, 
ηp² = 0.395, indicating a large effect (Cohen, 1988; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Specifically, 
participants’ performance was significantly higher at pre-ANAM (M = 89.04, SD = 8.70) in 
comparison to post-ANAM (M = 78.88, SD = 13.61).   
The main effect of the Motivation conditions was also significant, F(1, 156) = 4.51, p < 
.05, ηp²  = 0.028, indicating a small effect (Cohen, 1988; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). That is, 
Motivation conditions (M = 82.51, SD = 8.82) significantly decreased performance on the 
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ANAM total score measure from Pre to Post, in comparison to the No Motivation conditions (M 
= 85.41, SD = 9.00).   
The main effect of the Coached conditions was not significant F(2, 156) = 1.97, p = .143, 
ηp²  = 0.025.  That is, Coached plus Warning (M = 84.56, SD = 8.75), Coached (M = 82.09, SD = 
8.29), and No Coached (M = 85.24, SD = 9.75) did not differ between groups, ps > .05. See 
Table 7 for the Pre- to Post- ANAM total accuracy scores ANOVA source table.  
Table 7 
     
Pre-to Post- ANAM Total Accuracy Scores ANOVA Source Table    
  df F Partial η²  p  
Motivation (M) x Coached (C) x Time (T) 2 8.12** 0.095 0.00  
M x T 2 3.07 0.019 0.08  
C x T 2 9.34** 0.107 0.00  
M 1 4.51* 0.028 0.04  
C 2 1.97 0.025 0.14  
T 1 102.04** 0.395 0.00  
Note. N = 162, df, degrees of freedom; M, motivation incentive; C, coached condition; T, time  
** p < .01 * p < .05      
 
Research Question 2: Is there a significant difference in performance between treatment 
and control groups on the post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
To explore whether coaching and motivational incentive influenced participants’ ANAM 
total accuracy scores, a 2 (Motivation) x 3 (Coached) Mixed Factorial ANOVA was conducted 
to compare post-ANAM total accuracy scores.  Based on Levene’s F tests, the homogeneity of 
variance assumption was satisfied, F(5, 156) = 1.33, p = .255).  The results revealed a significant 
two-way interaction between the Motivation and Coached groups on the ANAM total accuracy 
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measure, F(2, 156) = 8.35, p < .001, ηp² = 0.097, indicating a moderate effect (Cohen, 1988; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). See Table 8 for Means Post-test ANAM total accuracy scores.  
 
Table 8.   
Means of ANAM Total Accuracy Scores  
 Posttest 
  M 
Uncoached (C1) x No Motivation (M1) (Control) 90.08 
Coached (C2) x M1 72.85 
Coached plus Warning (C3) x M1 80.70 
C1 x Motivation (M2) 74.19 
C2 x M2 75.12 
C3 x M2 80.35 
Note: M1 = No Motivation Incentive, M2 = Motivation Incentive, C1 = Uncoached Instruction, 
C2 = Coached Instruction, C3 = Coached plus Warning Instruction 
 
 
The main effect of the Motivation groups was significant, F(1, 156) = 5.64, p < .05, ηp² = 
0.035, indicating a small effect (Cohen, 1988; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  That is, receiving a 
motivational incentive (M = 76.56, SD = 13.20) significantly decreased performance on the post 
ANAM total score measure, in comparison to the groups that did not receive a motivational 
incentive (M = 81.21, SD = 13.69).  In addition, the main effect of coaching was also significant, 
F(2, 156) = 6.46, p < .05, ηp² = 0.077, indicating a moderate effect.  Specifically, receiving a 
coaching instruction (M = 73.98, SD = 12.35) significantly decreased performance on the post 
ANAM total score measure, in comparison to the groups that did not receive a coaching 
instruction (M = 82.14, SD = 13.76), p < .05.  In addition, receiving a coaching instruction (M = 
73.98, SD = 12.35) significantly decreased performance on the post ANAM total score measure, 
in comparison to the groups that received a coaching plus warning instruction (M = 80.53, SD = 
13.50), p < .05.  The coached plus warning instruction and no coaching instruction conditions did 
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not differ significantly on the post ANAM total score measure. See Table 9 for the Post-ANAM 
total accuracy scores ANOVA source table. 
 
Table 9      
Post-ANAM Total Accuracy Scores ANOVA Source      
  df F Partial η²  p  
Motivation (M) x Coached (C)  2 8.35** 0.097 0.00  
M 1 5.64* 0.035 0.02  
C 2 6.46** 0.077 0.00  
Note. N = 162, df, degrees of freedom; M, motivation incentive; C, coached condition; T, time  
** p < .01 * p < .05      
 
 
Research Question 3: Do participants in the treatment groups (i.e. instructed to feign mTBI 
symptoms) differ in their ANAM Effort Measure in comparison to control? 
To explore whether participants in the treatment groups (i.e. instructed to feign mTBI 
symptoms) differ in their ANAM Effort Measure in comparison to control, a logistic regression 
analysis was conducted to verify which factors help predict whether a participant will put forth 
effort during ANAM administration using coaching and motivation as predictors. Although the 
ANAM does not have an embedded malingering scale, the ANAM Effort Measure scores were 
used for evaluating the validity of scores.  Any values rated as poor effort (i.e. scores 14 and 
above) on the ANAM Effort Measure were considered a detection of malingering due to lack of 
effort while completing the assessment.  The Wald Chi-Square demonstrated there is a difference 
between the control and treatment groups (χ2 = 8.92, p = .003).  The results indicated that when 
participants were in the control group, the odds ratio was 0.05 and therefore participants in the 
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control group have 95.0% decreased odds as compared to treatment groups to put forth sub-
optimal effort (Table 10). 
  
Table 10     
Coefficients for Motivation, Coached, and Control Groups 
   
  B SE Exp(B) p 
No Motivation (M1) 0.56  0.46 0.57 0.007 
Uncoached (C1) 0.50  0.71 1.64 0.486 
Coached (C2) 0.23  0.68 1.26 0.736 
M1 x C1 (Control) 2.94 0.98 0.05 0.003 
M1 x C2 1.16 1.00 3.19 0.247 
Note: * p < .01; The motivation (M2) and the coached plus warning (C2) conditions were used as 
reference groups.   
  
 The differences in the proportion of putting forth effort was analyzed by using pairwise 
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction which found a statistically significant difference in 
mean effort between the participants in the Coached (M = 0.86, SE = 0.107) and the Uncoached 
(M = 0.50, SE = 0.107) conditions, p <.05.  However, there was not a significant difference 
between the Coached (M = 0.86, SE = 0.078) and the Coached plus warning (M = 0.73, SE = 
0.078) conditions, p = .291 and the Uncoached (M = 0.50, SE = 0.114) and the Coached plus 
warning (M = 0.73, SE = 0.114) conditions, p = .142).  Additionally, there was a statistically 
significant difference in mean effort between the participants in the Motivation (M = 0.82, SE = 
0.086) and No Motivation (M = 0.58, SE = 0.086) conditions, p < .05).  Overall, there was a 
statistically significant difference in mean effort between the participants in the treatment and 
control groups, p < .001. 
 As shown in Figure 2, the estimated mean effort for those participants in the control 
group is 0.15, while it is 0.89 for those in the coached condition, 0.85 for those in the motivation 
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condition, 0.81 for those in the coached and motivation condition, 0.78 for those in the coached 
plus warning and motivation condition, and 0.67 for those in coached plus warning condition.  
 
Figure 2. Effort Measure Mean Scores, optimal effort = 0, sub-optimal = 1 
 
Research Question 4: Are there positive interactions between the motivation and coached 
conditions?  
 4a. Are there positive interactions between the motivation and coached conditions 
between treatment and control groups on the pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy scores?  
To explore whether coaching and motivational incentive influenced participants ANAM 
total accuracy scores over time, a 2 (Motivation) x 3 (Coached) x 2 (Time) Mixed Factorial 
Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted to compare pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy 
scores.  Based on Levene’s F tests, the homogeneity of variance assumption was satisfied for 
Time 1 (F(5, 156) = 1.00, p = 0.420) and Time 2 F(5, 156) = 1.33, p = 0.255).  As previously 
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stated, the results revealed a significant three-way interaction between the Motivation and 
Coached groups on the ANAM total accuracy measure from Pre to Post, Wilk's Λ = 0.905, F(2, 
156) = 8.12, p < .001,η𝑝𝑝2   = 0.095, indicating a moderate effect (Cohen, 1988; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). 
Pairwise comparisons revealed the No Motivation x Coached performance significantly 
decreased from pre-ANAM (M = 90.32, SD = 8.18) to post-ANAM (M = 72.83, SD = 11.14) 
total accuracy scores. The No Motivation x Coached plus Warning condition also significantly 
decreased from pre-ANAM (M = 89.73, SD = 8.59) to post-ANAM (M = 80.70, SD = 14.83) 
total accuracy scores. The No Motivation x Uncoached (Control) condition did not differ 
significantly from pre- (M = 88.77, SD = 8.48) to post- (M = 90.08, SD = 8.81) on the ANAM 
total accuracy scores.  
For the Motivation conditions, the Motivation x Uncoached performance significantly 
decreased from pre-ANAM (M = 87.90, SD = 8.36) to post-ANAM (M = 72.19, SD = 13.32) 
total accuracy scores. The Motivation x Coached performance significantly decreased from pre-
ANAM (M = 90.05, SD = 8.50) to post-ANAM (M = 75.12, SD = 13.57) total accuracy scores. 
Finally, the Motivation x Coached plus Warning condition performance significantly decreased 
from pre-ANAM (M = 87.45, SD = 10.34) to post-ANAM (M = 80.35, SD = 12.30) total 
accuracy scores. See Table 11 for Means and Standard Deviations of Pre- and Post-test ANAM 
total accuracy scores.  
In summary, there were significant decreases in all conditions except the control 
condition (No Motivation and Uncoached), thus explaining the three-way interaction. 
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Table 11.      
Means and Standard Deviations of ANAM Pre- and Post-test Total Accuracy Scores 
 Pretest   Posttest   
  M SD M SD 
Uncoached (C1) x No Motivation (M1) (Control) 88.77 8.48 90.08 8.81 
Coached (C2) x M1 90.32 8.18 72.83 11.14 
Coached plus Warning (C3) x M1 89.73 8.59 80.70 14.83 
C1 x Motivation (M2) 87.90 8.36 72.19 13.32 
C2 x M2 90.05 8.50 75.12 13.57 
C3 x M2 87.45 10.34 80.35 12.30 
Note: M1 = No Motivation Incentive, M2 = Motivation Incentive, C1 = Uncoached Instruction  
C2 = Coached Instruction, C3 = Coached plus Warning Instruction 
 
 
 4b. Are there positive interactions between the motivation and coached conditions 
between treatment and control groups on the post- ANAM total accuracy scores? 
To explore whether coaching and motivational incentive influenced participants’ ANAM 
total accuracy scores, a 2 (Motivation) x 3 (Coached) Mixed Factorial ANOVA was conducted 
to compare post-ANAM total accuracy scores.  Based on Levene’s F tests, the homogeneity of 
variance assumption was satisfied, F(5, 156) = 1.33, p = .255).  As previously stated, the results 
revealed a significant two-way interaction between the Motivation and Coached groups on the 
ANAM total accuracy measure, F(2, 156) = 8.35, p < .001, ηp² = 0.097, indicating a moderate 
effect (Cohen, 1988; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). See Table 12 for Means Post-test ANAM total 
accuracy scores.  
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Table 12.   
Means of ANAM Total Accuracy Scores  
 Posttest 
  M 
Uncoached (C1) x No Motivation (M1) (Control) 90.08 
Coached (C2) x M1 72.85 
Coached plus Warning (C3) x M1 80.70 
C1 x Motivation (M2) 74.19 
C2 x M2 75.12 
C3 x M2 80.35 
Note: M1 = No Motivation Incentive, M2 = Motivation Incentive, C1 = Uncoached Instruction  
C2 = Coached Instruction, C3 = Coached plus Warning Instruction 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the current study was to examine whether coaching individuals how to 
feign mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) and providing a motivational incentive (i.e., a $50 gift 
card lottery) influenced performance and effort on the Automated Neuropsychological 
Assessment Metrics (ANAM). The main goal of this work was to apply expectancy x value 
theory to explain and replicate the finding that receiving a motivational incentive and coaching 
(i.e., providing information about mTBI symptoms) will significantly impact test performance.   
The theoretical constructs within motivational theory, such as, expectancy x value, relate 
to why and how people malinger (Anderson, 2008; Constantinou & McCaffrey, 2003; Erdal, 
2009; Nagle et al., 2006). Expectancy x value theory combines one’s expectancy to succeed and 
the value placed on successfully achieving a given task (Atkinson, 1957; Eccles & Wigfield, 
2002; Eccles, Wigfield, & Schiefele, 1998; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992, 2000).  In relation to 
malingering, expectancy x value theory would predict that the motivation to malinger is a 
function not only of motivational incentives but also requires expectations that one can malinger 
well and will not be caught doing so. A person may believe he or she can malinger well if he or 
she is coached (i.e. has knowledge on the specific disorder expected to be feigned).  Specifically, 
if a participant is coached on mTBI, he or she may be more confident about feigning mTBI 
because he or she will have knowledge of the symptoms. One would therefore predict, if the 
participant is confident about completing the task (i.e. malingering well and without being 
caught) due to the effects of coaching and is provided a motivation incentive to malinger 
undetected, then he or she will put forth more effort to malinger undetected. If this happens, the 
ANAM total accuracy scores for the coached plus motivational condition group will be 
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significantly lower, indicating mTBI. That is, individuals without impairment typically perform 
in the 80th percentage range on many ANAM subscales (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013; Vincent 
et al., 2012). Whereas individuals with known cognitive impairment typically perform 
significantly below the 80th but above the 50th percentage range (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013; 
Woodhouse et al., 2013).  Thus, if an individual scores significantly below the 50th percentile— 
indicating an atypical score in total items correct—the individual will be caught malingering or 
exhibiting “poor effort” (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013). In the present study, the ANAM-PVI 
scores (i.e. a participant’s effort) were expected to differ between the treatment groups and the 
control group given the control group will be instructed to perform their best. The present 
research is the first to evaluate malingering in the context of expectancy x value theory.   
Summary of Findings 
The findings of the present study suggest that providing both a coaching instruction and a 
motivational incentive (i.e. treatment groups) decreased the participants’ performance on their 
overall ANAM total accuracy scores, in comparison to the participants not receiving the 
treatment (i.e. control). Further, the ANAM Effort Measure was found to be a robust measure for 
detecting participants who feigned mTBI, which would render scores invalid for a clinical 
diagnosis.    
The main goal of this study was to evaluate two conditions designed to impact 
performance on an assessment. The participants in the coached conditions were provided with a 
one-page document including several mTBI symptoms listed in the DSM-V (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). In addition to the one-page document, participants in the coached 
plus warning conditions were informed that to be identified as faking the disorder, to not 
exaggerate the symptoms too much.  Whereas, participants in the motivation conditions were 
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informed they were eligible for an incentive for participation (i.e., a $50 gift card lottery) if they 
can feign mTBI and avoid being identified as faking the disorder.   
Preliminary Analysis. In previous studies, baseline scores were not assessed before the 
participants were presented with the intervention (Erdal 2004, 2009). I addressed this gap by 
including a pre-ANAM measure. On the pre-ANAM or baseline assessment scores, there were 
no significant differences between groups in respect to age, GPA, ethnicity, grade level, and 
gender. That is, the presence of selection effects, i.e., whether there are significant initial 
differences between the groups were not found.  
Further, there were no significant differences in Coached conditions in respect to 
ethnicity, grade level, and gender and Motivational conditions in respect to ethnicity and grade 
level. However, there were significant differences in Motivational conditions in respect to 
gender. The proportion of women who were in the motivation condition (75.31%) was greater 
than the proportion of women in the no motivation condition (55.56%). In addition, the 
proportion of men in the no motivation condition (44.44%) was greater than the proportion of 
men in the motivation condition (24.69%). This poses a small threat to internal validity given 
that the present study implemented a true-experimental design with randomization to each 
condition.  
In addition, there were no significant differences between groups on the pre-ANAM 
overall (total) accuracy scores.  The study design (i.e., randomization) and similarity of ANAM 
scores between groups prior to coaching is evidence against differential selection as a threat to 
internal validity. Therefore, based on the preliminary analysis as a whole, the significant effects 
found in this study were a direct result of the two conditions (i.e. motivational incentive and 
coaching).     
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Hypothesis One. The first hypothesis predicted a significant difference in between 
treatment and control groups on the pre- and post- ANAM total accuracy scores. Specifically, the 
coaching plus motivational incentive and coaching conditions was expected to decrease the 
ANAM total accuracy scores (feigning clinical mTBI) between the pre- and post-. The degree to 
which the ANAM total accuracy scores were differentially influenced by coaching and 
motivation was exploratory.   
Participants assigned to the motivational and coaching conditions scored differently on 
the ANAM between pre- and post- administration. Specifically, participants who did not receive 
the treatment conditions (i.e. control) performed similarly on both the pre- and post- ANAM 
administration. As hypothesized, receiving coaching and a motivational incentive influenced the 
way in which participants performed in comparison to not receiving coaching and a motivational 
incentive. For the post-ANAM treatment administration, the control group obtained the highest 
ANAM total accuracy scores in comparison to all the treatment groups. The coached plus 
warning instruction either with or without a motivational incentive performed better on the post-
ANAM in comparison to the coached instruction with and without the motivational condition 
and uncoached instruction with the motivational condition. In contrast, the coached instruction 
with and without the motivational condition and uncoached instruction with the motivational 
condition obtained lower post-ANAM total accuracy scores in comparison to the other groups. 
These results are in line with previous research findings which indicate a participant can modify 
his or her response to a measure with the use of a motivational incentive or coaching in the 
diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder (Bagby, et al., 2002; Bowen & Brant, 2006; Erdal, 2009; 
Erdal, 2004; Greve et al., 2003; Guriel-Tennant & Fremouw, 2006; Larrabee, 2003; Rogers, et 
al., 1993; Rogers et al., 1991; Rogers, et al., 2005; Youngjohn et al., 1997). Further, these results 
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are not surprising given the prior research on the coached plus warning instruction has been 
shown to neutralize malingering (Erdal, 2004). Regardless of receiving the motivational 
incentive, the groups receiving the coached plus warning instruction, performed similarly, 
receiving the second highest ANAM total accuracy scores in comparison to the control group 
and the other treatment groups. That is, the coached plus warning instruction groups did not 
feign mTBI symptoms as much as the other treatment groups. As stated above, these results are 
in line with previous research related to the coached plus warning instruction (Erdal, 2004). 
Hypothesis Two. The second hypothesis predicted a significant difference in 
performance between treatment and control groups on the post- ANAM total accuracy scores. 
Specifically, the coaching plus motivational incentive and coaching conditions was expected to 
have lower ANAM total accuracy scores (feigning clinical mTBI) than the other groups. The 
degree to which the ANAM total accuracy scores was differentially influenced by coaching and 
motivation was exploratory.   
Participants assigned to the motivational and coaching conditions scored differently on 
the post-ANAM between treatment and control groups. As hypothesized, receiving the coached 
condition and motivational incentive changed the way the participants performed in comparison 
to not receiving the coached condition and motivational incentive. In line with the findings 
above, the control group performed significantly higher on the post-ANAM total accuracy 
measure in comparison to all the treatment groups. The coached plus warning instruction either 
with or without a motivational incentive performed significantly higher on the post-ANAM total 
accuracy measure in comparison to the coached instruction with and without the motivational 
condition and uncoached instruction with the motivational condition. Finally, the coached 
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instruction with and without the motivational condition and uncoached instruction with the 
motivational condition received significantly lower scores in comparison to the other groups.   
In addition, the motivational incentive alone decreased the participants’ performance on 
their overall post-ANAM total accuracy scores, in comparison to the participants that did not 
receive a motivational incentive. These findings are in line with prior research suggesting that 
participants who are motivated to feign a disorder are able to modify their response to an 
assessment (Erdal, 2009; Erdal, 2004; Greve et al., 2003; Larrabee, 2003; Youngjohn et al., 
1997).   
Furthermore, the participants who received the coaching instructions decreased their 
performance on their overall ANAM total accuracy scores, in comparison to the groups that did 
not receive a coaching instruction. That is, as with prior research, participants who are coached 
in the diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder are able to more accurately simulate the symptoms 
of the disorder on the psychological assessment (Bagby, et al., 2002; Bowen & Brant, 2006; 
Guriel-Tennant & Fremouw, 2006; Rogers, et al., 1993; Rogers et al., 1991; Rogers, et al., 
2005). Specifically, the participants receiving the coaching instruction feigned mTBI by 
decreasing their performance on the ANAM significantly in comparison to the participants that 
received the coaching plus warning instruction or no coaching instruction. However, the 
participants receiving the coaching plus warning instruction did not differ significantly in their 
performance on the ANAM in comparison to those who received the no coaching instruction.  
Hypothesis Three. The third hypothesis predicted the participants who are trained to 
malinger mTBI will differ in their ANAM Effort Measure scores in comparison to control. 
Although the ANAM does not have an embedded malingering scale, the ANAM Effort Measure 
score was used for evaluating the validity of mTBI scores. Any values rated as poor effort (i.e. 
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scores 14 and above) on the ANAM Effort Measure are considered a detection of malingering 
due to lack of effort while completing the assessment. In this study, participants in the control 
group demonstrated a difference in their ANAM Effort Measure scores in comparison to all the 
treatment groups. Specifically, all the treatment groups (coached plus warning instruction and 
motivation incentive, coached instruction and motivation incentive, uncoached instruction and 
motivation incentive, coached plus warning instruction and no motivation incentive, coached 
instruction and no motivation incentive) were detected by the ANAM Effort Measure as putting 
forth sub-optimal or poor effort (i.e., malingering). The ANAM Effort Measure indicated that the 
control group put forth optimal effort (i.e., did not malinger mTBI). These results are in line with 
previous research findings that participants’ ANAM Effort Measure scores would differ among 
treatment and control groups (Roebuck-Spencer et al., 2013). These findings speak to the 
importance of the validity of ANAM assessment as it was robust against participants’ 
malingering. Specifically, results demonstrated the ANAM Effort Measure successfully 
differentiated between the participants that were simulating (or feigning) mTBI and those who 
were not.     
Hypothesis Four. The fourth hypothesis predicted a positive interaction between the 
motivation and coached conditions on the ANAM total accuracy scores. There were significant 
differences between the coached instruction with and without the motivation condition and 
uncoached instruction with the motivation condition in comparison to the control group. 
However, there were not significant differences between the group that received both the 
motivation and coaching from all other groups suggesting that there was not a positive 
interaction between these two conditions providing an additional effect above and beyond the 
other conditions. The results suggest that providing either coached or motivation instructions will 
 
68 
decrease participants’ scores in comparison to not providing the instructions. In addition, 
combining the two instructions will not significantly decrease participants’ scores in comparison 
to receiving either coached or motivation instructions. Suggesting that there was not a positive 
interaction between motivation and coached conditions. In other words, there is no added benefit 
in combining the two conditions in respect to aiding the participant in feigning a disorder.   
This result was in line with previous research finding no interaction between motivation 
and coaching (Erdal, 2004). It is possible one can decrease performance without the coached 
instruction based on the participant’s previous knowledge on the topic being asked to feign. For 
example, the participants may have been aware, in general, of some of the symptoms a person 
with mild traumatic brain injury may exhibit, such as, memory deficits. If this were the case, the 
participant would be able to decrease their score on the ANAM. These findings speak to the 
importance of assessing a participant’s knowledge of the topic being asked to feign.  
Overall there was no significant change in performance by combining both motivational 
and coaching conditions.   
Theoretical Implications 
The present study provides theoretical implications on the effects of coaching and 
motivational incentives have on simulating mTBI symptoms on a validated, psychological 
measurement in the context of expectancy x value theory. Expectancy x value theory views 
motivation as personal views related to the likelihood of achieving a goal and the desire to 
complete that goal (as cited in Graham & Weiner, 2012). Within the construct of motivation, the 
present study supports the finding that people can alter their performance if they receive a 
motivational incentive (Erdal, 2009; Erdal, 2004; Greve et al., 2003; Larrabee, 2003; Youngjohn 
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et al., 1997). In the present study, the participants receiving a motivational incentive significantly 
decreased their performance on the ANAM in order to feign mTBI. However, although the 
motivational incentive significantly decreased performance indicating mTBI, these individuals 
were detected as malingering by the psychological assessment which is in line with the previous 
research that people receiving a motivational incentive, such as, compensation, will be detected 
by an assessment as a malingerer (Erdal, 2004; Erdal, 2009).  
Within the construct of coaching, the present study supports the finding that people can 
be taught to malinger (Bagby, et al., 2002; Bowen & Brant, 2006; Guriel-Tennant & Fremouw, 
2006; Rogers, et al., 1993; Rogers et al., 1991; Rogers, et al., 2005).  The participants receiving a 
coaching instruction were found to decrease their performance on the ANAM which indicated 
symptoms of mTBI. However, individuals who were coached to feign mTBI were detected by 
the psychological assessment as malingering (Erdal, 2004; Rogers et al., 1990).  Thus, coaching 
alone was not sufficient to train individuals to feign mTBI undetected.   
By combining the effects of coaching and motivation on ANAM performance, the 
present study attempted to apply expectancy x value theory, one’s expectancy to succeed and the 
value placed on successfully achieving a given task, to evaluate the multiplicative effects of 
providing a motivational incentive and coaching on simulating mTBI symptoms (Atkinson, 
1957; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Eccles, Wigfield, & Schiefele, 1998; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992, 
2000). 
The findings of this study were not consistent with my expectation because no 
multiplicative effects were identified (except that there was a three-way interaction indicating 
that warnings had an effect).  It appears that providing coaching or an incentive are both about 
equally effective in reducing performance and effort.  This finding does not support Value x 
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Expectancy theory, but it could be due to a methodological artifact.  Given a motivational 
incentive, it might be easy enough to reduce performance and effort without coaching.  Given 
coaching, participants might be sufficiently (intrinsically) motivated to try to feign symptoms, 
when instructed.  All the treatment conditions instructed participants to feign TBI.  The control 
condition, at posttest, did not instruct participants to feign symptoms, but to “do their best.”  A 
better test of Value x Expectancy Theory would have been to include another control condition 
that instructed participants to feign symptoms, but without coaching or an incentive. 
Contributions of this Study and Practical Implications 
This study makes important contributions to research on the influence of motivational 
incentives and coaching instructions on feigning a mental disorder.  First, the present study 
provides new empirical evidence to the limited research that exists in this area. Currently, there 
is a limited amount of research that explores feigning mTBI with the combinational use of 
motivational incentives and coaching instructions (Erdal, 2004). This research provides 
additional information on the effects of providing a motivational incentive and coaching have on 
simulating mTBI symptoms, including the interaction between the two. Second, it provides new 
and valuable information about ANAM Effort Measure and its ability to detect a person who is 
malingering mTBI. This study helps fill the gap that exists in the research about the interactions 
between motivation and coaching on an assessment, specifically, the ANAM. In addition, the 
present results have important implications for practitioners in determining the validly of ANAM 
results before making a clinical diagnosis of mTBI.   
Overall, motivational incentives and coaching instructions aided in feigning mTBI 
symptoms on the ANAM by participants performing poorly on the ANAM total accuracy  
measure. Even though participants could feign mTBI symptoms when provided with coaching 
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and motivation, the ANAM Effort Measure detected the participants feigning mTBI which 
rendered their scores invalid for a clinical diagnosis. This result is important to note because the 
ANAM was chosen by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs as the pre- and post-
deployment assessment for all U.S. Military Service Members to be assessed (Roebuck-Spencer 
et al., 2013; United States House of Representatives H.R. 4986, 2008).  Specifically, the ANAM 
is frequently used for a baseline assessment (e.g., before military personnel are deployed 
overseas) and detecting Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) in the military (Johnson, Gilliland, 
K., & Vincent, 2009; Roebuck-Spencer, Vincent, Twillie, Logan, Lopez, Friedl, & Gilliland, 
2012; Vincent, Roebuck-Spencer, Gilliland, & Schlegel, 2012) and for sport concussions 
(Cernich, Reeves, Sun, & Bleiberg, 2007). Therefore, the ANAM’s Effort Measure and its ability 
to detect a person who is malingering mTBI is important to ensure practitioners have obtained a 
valid and reliable psychological assessment result before making or not making a clinical 
diagnosis of mTBI.  
Limitations and Suggestion for Future Research 
 This study has several methodological strengths. First, the study is ecologically valid 
because it was conducted in a quiet environment setting and the ANAM was administered as 
instructed by the ANAM Manual. Second, it is a true experimental design with randomization 
controlling for threats to internal validity such as differential selection. Third, the study used a 
larger sample size per group (27 participants) than previous studies.   
 The study also had some limitations that could be addressed in future research. First, 
instructions to feign were confounded with the treatment conditions, so future research should 
explore the effect of the treatments against just instructions to feign (without coaching and 
incentives). Second, the pairwise comparisons between the Coach + Warning Conditions and the 
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other conditions were in the expected direction but not significant; a larger sample with more 
statistical power, would have been desirable. Third, the study’s participants were students 
enrolled in courses in education at a university which may affect external validity. Future 
research should include a more diverse population, including participants from the general public 
to enhance external validity. Fourth, although a real-world incentive (i.e. $50 gift card lottery) as 
opposed to a simulated one (i.e. pretending participant will receive a large settlement) was used 
in this study, the motivational incentive could have been more valuable to the participants. 
During the pilot study, students mentioned a more valuable incentive would be an additional 
research credit. Thus, evaluating participants value of the incentive may provide additional 
information about their motivation to malinger in future research. Fifth, the mTBI symptoms 
checklist was not used to assess pre-knowledge of mTBI because all participants checked most 
of the symptoms. Future research should include a pre-knowledge assessment where participants 
list mTBI symptoms in an open-ended manner instead of rather than checking off symptoms 
from a list. Finally, there were less males than females in each group. Future research should 
include an equal distribution of males and females per group to enhance internal validity.   
Conclusions 
 The present study examined the effectiveness of Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) 
coaching (i.e., providing information about mTBI symptoms) and providing a motivational 
incentive (i.e., lottery to win a $50 gift card) on the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment 
Metrics (ANAM) test performance. As a result, the primary goal of the present research was to 
investigate the finding that receiving a motivational incentive and coaching (i.e., providing 
information about mTBI symptoms) will significantly impact test performance. The overall 
findings of the study suggest that providing either a coaching instruction or a motivational 
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incentive (i.e. treatment groups) decreased the participants’ performance on their overall ANAM 
total accuracy scores, in comparison to the participants not receiving the treatment (i.e. control). 
In addition, the ANAM detected when participants were putting forth poor effort or feigning 
mTBI.    
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT  
Department of Educational Psychology and Higher Education 
  
  
TITLE OF STUDY: MALINGERING UNDETECTED 
INVESTIGATOR(S): E. Michael Nussbaum, Ph.D.; Jennifer Golanics, J.D., M.S. 
For questions or concerns about the study, you may contact Dr. Michael Nussbaum at 
nussbaum@unlv.nevada.edu or Jennifer Golanics at golanics@unlv.nevada.edu.   
 
For questions regarding the rights of research subjects, any complaints or comments regarding 
the manner in which the study is being conducted, contact the UNLV Office of Research 
Integrity – Human Subjects at 702-895-2794, toll free at 877-895-2794 or via email at 
IRB@unlv.edu. 
   
 
Purpose of the Study 
You are invited to participate in a research study.  The purpose of this study is to understand 
whether coaching and motivation are able to affect a participant’s test performance. 
 
Participants 
You are being asked to participate in the study because you fit this criteria: you are over 18 and 
enrolled in either EPY 303, EPY 451, or EPY 702. You do not have a previous diagnosis of 
Traumatic Brain Injury.    
 
Procedures  
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to do the following:  
 
1. Participate in a single session that will last approximately 60 minutes.   
2. You will be asked to complete a demographic survey, mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
Symptoms Checklist, and an assessment for mild Traumatic Brain Injury.   
 
Benefits of Participation  
There will not be direct benefits to you as a participant in this study.  However, we hope to learn 
valuable information about how students complete assessments.  
 
Risks of Participation  
There are risks involved in all research studies. This study may include only minimal risks. You 
may feel bored or tired when completing the questionnaires or assessment. 
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Cost /Compensation  
There will be no financial cost to you to participate in this study.  The study will take one (1) 
hour of your time.  You will be compensated by receiving one (1) credit hour of the research 
requirement for your EPY 303/451/702 course for every one (1) hour of participation.    
 
 
Confidentiality  
All information gathered in this study will be kept as confidential as possible.  No reference will 
be made in written or oral materials that could link you to this study.  All records will be stored 
in a locked facility at UNLV for 3 years after completion of the study.  After the storage time the 
information gathered will be destroyed.  
 
Voluntary Participation  
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate in this study or in any 
part of this study.  You may withdraw yourself and your data at any time without prejudice to 
your relations with UNLV. You are encouraged to ask questions about this study at the 
beginning or any time during the research study. If you choose to withdraw after only partial 
completion of the study, you will receive partial credit.   
 
Incomplete Disclosure 
Research designs sometimes require that the full intent of a study not be explained prior to 
participation. Although we have described the general nature of the tasks that you will be asked to 
perform, the full intent of the study will not be explained to you until after the completion of the 
study. At that time, we will provide you with a full debriefing which will include an explanation 
of the purpose of the study and other relevant background information pertaining to the study. You 
will also be given an opportunity to ask any questions you might have about the study and the 
procedures used in the study. 
 
Participant Consent:  
I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study.  I have been able to ask 
questions about the research study.  I am at least 18 years of age.  A copy of this form has been 
given to me. 
 
 
 
             
Signature of Participant                                             Date  
 
        
Participant Name (Please Print)                                               
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APPENDIX II 
ANAM SUBSCALES 
Simple Reaction Time 
 
Matching to the Sample 
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Procedural Reaction Time 
 
Code Substitution-Learning 
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APPENDIX III 
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please answer the following questions.   
         
Age (in years)  _____ 
 
Gender (F or M)    _____ 
 
Major   _____ 
         
GPA   _____ 
 
Grade (1=freshman,2==sophomore, 3=junior, 4=senior, 5=graduate)  _____ 
 
Ethnicity (1=American Indian/Alaskan Native, 2=African American, 3=Asian American, 
4=Caucasian/white, 5=Hispanic/Latino, 6=other)     _____ 
 
Have you been diagnosed with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)? (1=yes, 2=no)  _____ 
 
Do you currently receive government benefits for your Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) diagnosis? 
(1=yes, 2=no)                              _____ 
 
Do you know someone that has been diagnosed with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)? (1=yes, 
2=no)           _____ 
 
Do you know someone that is currently receive government benefits for your Traumatic Brain 
Injury (TBI) diagnosis?  _____ 
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APPENDIX IV 
mTBI SYMPTOMS CHECKLIST 
 
For the following items, answer as if you had a head injury.  
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APPENDIX V 
LIST OF MILD TBI SYMPTOMS 
  
You may experience one or more of the following symptoms if you have a diagnosis of 
mTBI: 
• Irritability 
• Anxiety 
• Fatigue 
• Headache 
• Sleep disorders 
• Dizziness 
• Memory loss 
• Poor attention/concentration 
• Speed of information processing slowed 
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